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I.

INTRODUCTION
1

Even as a twelve year old, DW was familiar with juvenile court.
Ramsey County had recently terminated his mother’s parental
rights, and although DW lived in St. Paul, the county social services
placed him in foster care in Minneapolis. Separated from his
mother and living with strangers, DW soon found himself in the
juvenile delinquency system.
On March 21, 2002, school officials called the police and had
DW arrested. According to the police report, a school secretary
walked in on DW “going through some papers” in her office. She
told him to leave. DW said he needed to use the phone, but she
refused. DW “grabbed [her] by the shoulders and shoved her into
the door. [She] struck her hand on the edge of the door and cut
her finger.” Police detained DW at the Hennepin County Juvenile
2
Detention Facility.
Hennepin County filed a delinquency petition charging
3
4
fourth-degree assault. At his hearing, DW waived his right to have
5
a parent present, waived his trial rights, “admitted” the assault, and

1. DW is a real person who was involved in real cases. All identifying
information has been intentionally left out of this article. The facts come from
available records, but juvenile court hearings are private and the transcripts were
not introduced in the adult trial. See MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 30.02.
2. See generally id. R. 5.02 (defining the power to detain juveniles).
3. Minnesota law makes assault of certain persons a more serious offense,
including school personnel: “Whoever assaults a school official while the official is
engaged in the performance of the official’s duties, and inflicts demonstrable
bodily harm, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. As used in this subdivision, ‘school
official’ includes teachers, school administrators, and other employees of a public
or private school.” MINN. STAT. § 609.2231, subdiv. 5 (2008). While a
misdemeanor may be punished with up to nintey days in jail, a gross misdemeanor
may include up to a year in jail. Id. § 609.03.
4. This is called a detention hearing. Under Minnesota law, detained
juveniles must be brought before a judge or referee within thirty-six hours of
being taken into custody. MINN. STAT. § 260B.176, subdiv. 2.
5. Minnesota law requires a parent to attend most juvenile court hearings.
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established a factual basis for the offense. The county reduced the
6
charge to simple assault in exchange for the admission. The judge
accepted the waivers and admission, but did not make any
7
findings. She transferred venue to Ramsey County for disposition,
where DW had a pending case. The judge detained DW until that
hearing.
DW appeared in Ramsey County on April 8, 2002, after having
been held in custody for eighteen days. Once again, no relative
appeared at the hearing. DW’s Ramsey County attorney alerted the
court that the parental rights of DW’s mother were recently
terminated and asked that a guardian ad litem be ordered to
8
protect DW’s interests. The judge ordered a guardian ad litem to
9
represent DW at “all further proceedings.” Despite this order, no
Id. § 260B.163, subdiv. 7. In fact the statute gives the juvenile court authority to
issue arrest warrants for parents who fail to appear. See id. § 260B.154. The statute
also provides parents significant rights to participate in all hearings. They are
“entitled to be heard, to present evidence material to the case, and to crossexamine witnesses appearing at the hearing.” Id. § 260B.163, subdiv. 9. The court
may not waive a child’s right to parental presence in a juvenile delinquency
hearing, and may only permit the child to waive presence with “an express waiver
voluntarily and intelligently made by the child after the child has been fully and
effectively informed of the right being waived.” Id. subdiv. 10.
6. See MINN. STAT. § 609.224, subdiv. 1 (categorizing charges of fifth-degree
assault).
7. The juvenile court rules require written findings within seven days of a
hearing. MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 13.09. Without written findings, it is very difficult to
recreate what happened at a hearing or review judicial reasoning at subsequent
hearings. In DW’s case, the authors had to try to track down transcripts of the
hearings to determine whether his rights had been vindicated.
8. Minnesota law provides for guardians in delinquency cases. MINN. STAT. §
260B.163, subdiv. 6. A guardian has obligations to the child to remain
independent of the court and court personnel. Id.
9. Cf. O'Neil v. Swan, 299 Minn. 206, 207, 218 N.W.2d 457, 457 (1974)
(“[T]he purpose of a guardianship ad litem . . . is to protect the rights of the
infant.”); In re Welfare of J.S., 470 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (“The
guardian ad litem has the duty to act within the judicial proceedings to further the
best interests of the child, and to do so the guardian ad litem must be free ‘to
engage in vigorous and autonomous representation of the child.’” (quoting
Tindell v. Rogosheske, 428 N.W.2d 386, 387 (Minn. 1988))). Minnesota law
outlines the guardian’s duties as:
(b) A guardian ad litem shall carry out the following responsibilities:
(1) conduct an independent investigation to determine the facts
relevant to the situation of the child and the family, which must
include, unless specifically excluded by the court, reviewing relevant
documents; meeting with and observing the child in the home
setting and considering the child’s wishes, as appropriate; and
interviewing parents, caregivers, and others with knowledge relevant
to the case;

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 2

772

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:2

guardian ad litem appeared at any subsequent hearings.
The judge adjudicated DW delinquent.
The transcript
referenced two files with different dates and case numbers.
However, the order stated only that “[t]he child is adjudicated
delinquent” without referencing to which petitions the order
10
applied. The judge released DW to a group home.
DW continued to have trouble adjusting to his new life, and
soon found himself back in detention. On July 31, 2002, DW, still
twelve, punched a seventeen-year-old boy living in his group home.
After being held in detention for thirty days, DW appeared in
Ramsey County Juvenile Court on a petition charging assault in the
11
fifth-degree.
Neither a relative nor the appointed guardian
appeared with DW. He waived his rights and admitted the petition.
The judge continued the case for disposition. At the disposition
hearing, DW once again appeared without a relative or the
12
guardian ad litem. The court continued DW on probation and
ordered him back to the group home. He was never adjudicated
(2) advocate for the child’s best interests by participating in
appropriate aspects of the case and advocating for appropriate
community services when necessary;
(3) maintain the confidentiality of information related to a case,
with the exception of sharing information as permitted by law to
promote cooperative solutions that are in the best interests of the
child;
(4) monitor the child’s best interests throughout the judicial
proceeding; and
(5) present written reports on the child’s best interests that include
conclusions and recommendations and the facts upon which they
are based.
(c) The court may waive the appointment of a guardian ad litem
pursuant to paragraph (a), whenever counsel has been appointed
pursuant to subdivision 2 or is retained otherwise, and the court is satisfied
that the interests of the minor are protected.
MINN. STAT. § 260B.163, subdiv. 6(b)–(c) (emphases added).
10. At the hearing, the judge ordered:
DW, I’m going to follow the recommendations of probation. I’m going
to order that you be placed in the [name withheld] group home for a
period of nine to twelve months, that you attend outpatient sexualoffender treatment as directed by probation, that you attend your
psychiatric appointments and follow the medication orders, that you
perform 24 hours of community work service, and that you make
restitution. I am going to—you will be adjudicated for this offense at this
time given the nature of the offenses.
11. See MINN. STAT. § 609.224 (defining fifth-degree assault).
12. The juvenile court rules do not require a court to enter an adjudication
of delinquency, but provide options including a continuance without any
adjudication for various amounts of time. MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 15.05, subdiv. 4.
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delinquent on this petition.
On November 3, 2003, Ramsey County filed a new petition
against DW, then thirteen, alleging assault in the fourth-degree.
The petition averred that DW “got angry with the [school]
principal when he intervened in a dispute with another student . . .
[so DW] pushed and swung at him.” Although there was no
guardian ad litem present, DW’s grandfather appeared with him at
this hearing. In exchange for an amended charge of assault in the
13
fifth-degree (simple assault) and dismissal of the other counts,
DW admitted the offense. The judge adjudicated DW delinquent
14
and placed him at a Department of Corrections residential facility
for twenty-one days.

13. Also included in the petition were charges of possession of a small
amount of marijuana and disorderly conduct.
14. The Department of Court Services committed DW to the Minnesota
Correctional Facility (“MCF-Togo”). According to the facility website:
Togo . . . is available for use on a per diem basis by all Minnesota juvenile
county courts and provides court and social service agencies with an
alternative residential program. Average daily population is about 41.
The MCF-Togo offers a three-week program, operated separately for boys
and girls between 13 and 17 years of age. It also offers a three-month
program for boys. Each program is intended to serve as a treatment
resource for juveniles who have experienced failure in the home, school
and community.
MCF-Togo Facility Information, MINN. DEP’T OF CORRS., http://www.doc.state.mn.us
/facilities/togo.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2010). The twenty-one day program is
described as follows:
Thistledew Wilderness Endeavors is a year-round, 21-day adventure
therapy program for boys or girls (the girls’ program operates separately
from the boys program and has a strong gender-specific focus). It
provides students with a safe but challenging environment in which to
discover and develop tools for change and personal growth. Wilderness
activities such as backpacking, canoeing, and cross-country skiing are
used, along with rock climbing and a teams course. Participants also
have a four-day solo experience, which includes cognitive skills, finalizing
goals and personal reflection. A therapy component helps residents
process their experiences and transfer them to real-life situations.
Students receive one-half year of school credit in English, one-half year
credit in science, and also one full year in physical education.
Id.
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Finally, on July 23, 2009, Minneapolis police arrested DW, then
15
nineteen, for “domestic assault.” Hennepin County charged the
domestic as a felony, enhanced by the three juvenile
“adjudications” which had occurred during a sixteen month
period, beginning seven years earlier.
This article examines an emerging issue in the use of juvenile
16
adjudications as an element in the enhancement of offenses. It
seems inherently unfair to change a misdemeanor to a felony based
on juvenile adjudications when the defendant was only twelve or
thirteen. In preparing DW’s defense, we found serious flaws in the
juvenile adjudications used to enhance the charge. The record
raised doubt about the legality of the adjudications, as to both the
fact of conviction and the reliability of the procedures. There is a
fundamental difference between using recidivism to lengthen
felony sentences and using recidivism to enhance the charge itself.
The difference amounts to a violation of due process protections.
The first part of this article briefly discusses the history of
juvenile court development and the trends in legislation which led
to enhancement by prior adjudication. The second part of this
article relates the litigation in DW’s case and attacks the
enhancement portion of the charge in the pretrial probable cause

15. Minnesota’s domestic assault statute provides:
Whoever does any of the following against a family or household member
. . . commits an assault and is guilty of a misdemeanor: (1) commits an
act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or
death; or (2) intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily harm upon
another.
MINN. STAT. § 609.2242, subdiv. 1. The statute’s penalty section makes a simple
assault a felony when the defendant has prior convictions for a variety of crimes,
even though they are not “domestics” and include juvenile convictions no matter
how young the child was at adjudication. Id. subdiv. 4.
16. The legislature has provided for use of juvenile adjudications as predicate
offenses and as enhancements in a variety of criminal contexts. E.g., MINN. STAT. §
169A.03, subdiv. 20 (including prior juvenile adjudications in the definition of a
prior impaired driving conviction for purposes of driving while impaired laws); id.
§ 609.224, subdivs. 2, 4 (enhancing fifth-degree assault to gross misdemeanor or
felony based on previous adjudications of delinquency); id. § 609.2242, subdivs. 2,
4 (enhancing domestic assault to gross misdemeanor or felony based on previous
adjudications of delinquency); id. § 609.377, subdiv. 3 (enhancing malicious
punishment of a child to a felony based on previous adjudications of
delinquency); id. § 609.749, subdiv. 4 (enhancing harassment to a felony based on
previous adjudications of delinquency); id. § 624.713, subdiv. 1 (making persons
adjudicated delinquent for a crime of violence ineligible to possess a firearm); see
also State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 614 (Minn. 2006) (listing the new ways in
which juvenile adjudications may be used as predicate offenses).
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hearing. The third part of this article contends that the use of
prior juvenile adjudications to enhance criminal offenses violates
due process. Due process requires the state to first prove the fact of
conviction, and second the reliability of the adjudication. This
article exposes serious flaws in the hypothesis that juvenile court
adjudication bears protections comparable to the adult jury-trial
system.
In conclusion, this article proposes eliminating the practice of
using juvenile adjudications to enhance offenses. If DW’s family
situation had not placed him in institutional settings, his behavior
might have been better controlled. Furthermore, but for zero17
tolerance policies, DW’s outbursts at school may not have come to
the attention of the police. Few adults would have been prosecuted
for DW’s conduct, and if they had, most adults would much more
vigorously defend against those prosecutions.
The article
concludes with some proposals for ending the practice of
enhancing charges with prior juvenile adjudications, as it is
inherently unfair.
II. PROSECUTING JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF
ADJUDICATIONS
Scholars have documented the history of Minnesota’s juvenile
18
court to a great degree.
The principle goal in establishing a

17. For discussion of the meaning and impact of zero-tolerance policies and
other approaches, see C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent
Offending and Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 681 (2005);
Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law
Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 982–86 (1995).
18. See, e.g., McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 612 (discussing the purpose and history of
the Minnesota juvenile system).
William Mitchell Law Review articles on
Minnesota’s Juvenile Court history include: Korine L. Larsen, With Liberty and
Juvenile Justice for All: Extending the Right to a Jury Trial to the Juvenile Courts, 20 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 835 (1994); Lisa McNaughton, Extending Roper’s Reasoning to
Minnesota’s Juvenile Justice System, 32 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 1063 (2006); John M.
Stuart & Amy K. R. Zaske, What Does a “Juvenile Adjudication” Mean in Minnesota?
Some New Answers After a Century of Change in Juvenile Court, 32 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 919 (2006); Wright S. Walling & Stacia Walling Driver, 100 Years of Juvenile
Court Practice in Minnesota—A Historical Overview and Perspective, 32 WM. MITCHELL.
L. REV. 883 (2006); Micala R. Gordon, Note, Case Note: It Doesn’t Have to End this
Way: The Minnesota Supreme Court Declares That the Sentence of Life Without Release as
Imposed on a Juvenile is Neither Cruel Nor Unusual in State v. Martin, 36 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1271 (2010); Emily A. Polachek, Note, Juvenile Transfer: From “Get
Better” to “Get Tough” and Where to Go From Here, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1162
(2009).
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19

juvenile court system was the rehabilitation of youthful offenders.
However, as the rate of juvenile crime rose, courts became more
punitive, and juvenile court practices came to resemble traditional
20
court prosecutions for adult offenders.
Concern over fair
treatment mounted, eventually compelling the United States
Supreme Court to curb these abuses through a due process
“explosion,” thus ensuring juveniles most constitutional
21
protections.

19. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967) (“The early reformers were
appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that children could be
given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals. They
were profoundly convinced that society’s duty to the child could not be confined
by the concept of justice alone. They believed that society’s role was not to
ascertain whether the child was ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent,’ but ‘[w]hat is he, how has he
become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of
the state to save him from a downward career.’ The child—essentially good, as
they saw it—was to be made ‘to feel that he is the object of (the state’s) care and
solicitude,’ not that he was under arrest or on trial. The rules of criminal
procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable. The apparent rigidities,
technicalities, and harshness which they observed in both substantive and
procedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded. The idea of crime and
punishment was to be abandoned.
The child was to be ‘treated’ and
‘rehabilitated,’
and
the
procedures,
from
apprehension
through
institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive.” (footnotes
omitted)); Peterson v. McAuliffe, 151 Minn. 467, 470, 187 N.W. 226, 227 (1922)
(“The whole tenor of the [juvenile court] act indicates that the sole purpose is the
welfare of the delinquent as well as the dependent or neglected child. The
treatment accorded the two classes is essentially the same. The rights of the
parents are amply protected. . . . That the delinquency charge is not intended as a
proceeding to punish for a crime . . . [that w]e consider [the juvenile court act]
designed to secure the welfare of delinquent children, and not to punish them,
and the restraint put on them to secure that end is not imprisonment, but
parental control by the state in cases where parents have failed.”).
20. Similarities between those two systems led the Court in other cases to
apply other constitutional protections to juvenile court. Barry C. Feld, The
Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based
on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1111, 1140–43 (2003); see also McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 612.
21. In Gault, the Court held that juveniles were entitled to due process
protections that attach in criminal cases; specifically, the right to notice of charges,
the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33. Three years
after Gault, the Supreme Court held that charges against juveniles must be proven
by the same standard applicable to criminal cases—beyond a reasonable doubt. In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). Then, in 1975, the Court held that double
jeopardy protections apply to juvenile delinquency cases. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S.
519, 541 (1975). Unfortunately, juveniles have no constitutional right to a jury
trial. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(“[T]rial by jury in the juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is not a constitutional

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss2/2

8

Mahoney and McCollum: DW's Cautionary Tale

2011]

DW’S CAUTIONARY TALE

777

A steep rise in juvenile crime occurred between the late 1980s
22
In response, the legislature enacted measures
and mid-1990s.
such as the Extended Juvenile Justice (“EJJ”) legislation, which was
designed to “get tough on crime” while retaining some of the
23
traditional juvenile justice protections. EJJ came to Minnesota in
24
1994 as an effort to balance rehabilitative goals with societal
25
protection.

requirement.”); see also In re K.A.A., 410 N.W.2d 836, 841 n.9 (Minn. 1987)
(suggesting approval of McKeiver, as noted in McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 612 n.7).
22. E.g., James C. Backstrom & Gary L. Walker, The Role of the Prosecutor in
Juvenile Justice: Advocacy in the Courtroom and Leadership in the Community, 32 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 963, 964 (2006) (“Arrests of juvenile offenders for murder
skyrocketed between 1985 and 1993, rising approximately 150%. Juvenile arrests
for aggravated assault also rose dramatically by more than 120% from 1983 to
1994. Total arrests of juveniles for serious, violent offenses increased by 67%
between 1985 and 1994. Arrests of juveniles for weapons offenses rose by 93%
during this same timeframe. In many areas of our country, substantial growth also
occurred in nonviolent juvenile crime during this time period. The growth rates
in juvenile crime between 1985 and 1994 far outpaced the rate for adults, which
began to decline in most categories beginning in 1992.” (footnotes omitted)). But
see LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, OFF BALANCE:
YOUTH, RACE, AND CRIME IN THE NEWS (2001), available at http://www.cclp.org
/documents/BBY/offbalance.pdf (noting that the most significant factor in the
public’s misinformation is the distortion of juvenile crime by the news media). A
comprehensive examination of crime in the news conducted by Lori Dorfman and
Vincent Schiraldi in 2001 found that: (1) the press reported juvenile crime out of
proportion to its actual occurrence; (2) violent crime, although representing only
twenty-two to twenty-four percent of juvenile crime from 1988 to 1997, dominated
the media’s coverage of juvenile offenses; (3) the media presented crimes without
an adequate contextual base for understanding why the crime occurred; (4) press
coverage unduly connected race and crime; and (5) juveniles were rarely covered
by the news other than to report on their violent criminal acts. Id. at 8–26.
23. See Kathryn A. Santelmann & Kari L. Lillesand, Extended Jurisdiction
Juveniles in Minnesota: A Prosecutor’s Perspective, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1303, 1304
(1999) (discussing the reasoning and circumstances of Minnesota’s creation of the
EJJ).
24. 1994 Minn. Laws, ch. 576, § 14 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §
260B.130 (2008)); see also Feld, supra note 17, at 1038–51 (describing the genesis
of the EJJ prosecution statute); Mary R. Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The Back-Door
to Prison: Waiver Reform, “Blended Sentencing,” and the Law of Unintended Consequences,
91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 997 (2001) (evaluating implementation of
Minnesota’s EJJ statute in Hennepin County); Stuart & Zaske, supra note 18, at
938.
25. Clarke, supra note 17, at 682; see also Feld, supra note 17, at 982–86.
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26

Ever younger children are being prosecuted in juvenile court.
27
Increasingly, juveniles are being “waived” into adult court.
Legislatures across the country have swept away many of the
hurdles traditionally imposed to prevent the transfer of children to
28
29
traditional adult court. The zero-tolerance policies of the 1990s
30
continue to reverberate in juvenile proceedings. State legislatures
26. E.g., Curtis Krueger, Under 12, Under Arrest, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Dec.
17, 2000), available at http://www.sptimes.com/News/121700/TampaBay/Under
_12__Under_Arres.shtml.
27. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subdiv. 1 (stating that a juvenile offender who
has committed a serious offense may be waived from juvenile court to adult court).
Sometimes this is a discretionary waiver, where the prosecutor files a motion to
have the young offender tried as an adult. See id. § 260B.141, subdiv. 4. After a
hearing, where evidence is presented for and against a waiver, the judge decides
whether the offender should be tried as a juvenile or an adult. See id. § 260B.125,
subdiv. 4. Sometimes, this is a mandatory waiver, where the law requires the young
offender to be tried as an adult. E.g., id. subdiv. 5. Many states have passed laws
allowing prosecutors to file adult charges against juveniles for certain serious
offenses, without having to apply for a waiver. E.g., id. Between 1992 and 1997
forty-five states made it easier to transfer juveniles to adult court. Jennifer Park,
Note, Balancing Rehabilitation and Punishment: A Legislative Solution for
Unconstitutional Juvenile Waiver Policies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 786, 797 (2008).
28. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 96–97 (2006), available at
http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf
(noting
that as many state legislatures have made it easier to transfer juvenile offenders
into the adult criminal justice system, sentencing options have been increased and
expanded to include punitive aspects and confidentiality laws have been relaxed);
see also Clarke, supra note 17, at 673–76 (discussing the evolution of punitive
philosophy with respect to children); Sacha M. Coupet, What to Do with the Sheep in
Wolf’s Clothing: The Role of Rhetoric and Reality About Youth Offenders in the Constructive
Dismantling of the Juvenile Justice System, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1303, 1317–18 (2000)
(discussing legislative reform of the juvenile justice system); Park, supra, at 797.
29. See generally RALPH C. MARTIAN, II, AM. BAR ASS’N, ZERO TOLERANCE POLICY
REPORT, available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/zerotolreport.html
(discussing state and local enactments and school district rules, providing for
punishment up to and including expulsion for any infraction, no matter how small
or allegedly excusable of certain school rules, such as bringing weapons, drugs, or
alcohol to the school premises).
30. Id.; see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Post-Racialism in the Inner City: Structure and
Culture in Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 921, 957–58 (2010) (“In 2000, states recorded
‘over three million school suspensions and over 97,000 expulsions.’ Statistically,
advocates report, ‘a child who has been suspended is more likely to be retained in
grade, to drop out, to commit a crime, and/or to end up incarcerated as an adult.’
In addition to suspension and expulsion, students increasingly suffer arrest and
referral to law enforcement officials or juvenile courts for prosecution.”); Linda F.
Giardino, Statutory Rhetoric: The Reality Behind Juvenile Justice Policies in America, 5 J.L.
& POL’Y 223 (1996); Margaret Graham Tebo, Zero Tolerance, Zero Sense, 86 A.B.A. J.
40, 41 (2000) (“Nationwide, statistics gathered by the Justice Policy Institute and
the U.S. Department of Education show that crime of all sorts is down at public
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have aggressively cracked down on juvenile crime, criminalizing
31
conduct and lengthening incarcerations. Juvenile adjudications
32
increasingly inflict wide-reaching collateral consequences.
These transformations in juvenile justice theory have had
33
lingering consequences. Traditionally, juvenile courts have been
34
private and closed to the public.
As a policy matter, it was
believed that youthful offenders should not be stigmatized forever
35
However, in a variety of ways,
because of one mistake.
adjudications follow the juvenile into adulthood.
Although not a conviction, an adjudication of delinquency has
many consequences. Some jurisdictions preclude persons with
36
certain juvenile adjudications from possessing firearms.
Such

schools since 1990—some studies say by as much as 30 percent. Less than 1
percent of all violent incidents involving adolescents occur on school grounds.”).
31. Park, supra note 27, at 789 (“After a perceived wave of violent juvenile
crime in the 1980s and 1990s, however, state legislators actively increased penalties
for juvenile crime and shifted the purpose of the juvenile court from
rehabilitation to punishment.”).
32. Alfieri, supra note 30, at 957–58.; see also Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Collateral
Consequences of Juvenile Proceedings, 15 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. MAG. 2, 59 (2000), available
at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/cjmcollconseq1.html.
33. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Justice in Minnesota: Framework for the Future,
COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUST., http://www.crimeandjustice.org/councilinfo.cfm?pID=46
(last visited Oct. 14, 2010) (discussing the negative consequences of the changes in
the juvenile justice system in Minnesota).
34. MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 2.01. Juvenile court proceedings are closed to the
public except as provided by law. Id. Rule 2.01 allows persons authorized by
statute to attend juvenile court proceedings. Id. Authorized persons include
members of the public, in cases where a juvenile over age sixteen is alleged to have
committed a felony, and victims. Id. The public is also entitled to be present
during a juvenile certification hearing where a juvenile over age sixteen is alleged
to have committed a felony, except that the court may exclude the public from
portions of a certification hearing to discuss psychological material or other
evidence that would not be accessible to the public in an adult proceeding. MINN.
STAT. § 260B.163, subdiv. 1(c)(2) (2008). The statute does not currently permit
exclusion when similar material is being presented in an extended jurisdiction
juvenile proceeding. This may simply be an oversight. Rule 2.02 permits
exclusion of persons from hearings, even when they have a right to participate, to
serve the child’s best interests. MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 2.02. “The Juvenile Court is
theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the child and of society rather
than adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of
guidance and rehabilitation . . . not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and
punishment.” Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
35. Giardino, supra note 30, at 251 (“[Minors] do not possess mature
judgment and may not fully realize the consequences of [their] acts . . . therefore
[such individuals] should not generally have to bear the stigma of a criminal
conviction for the rest of [their lives].” (quotation omitted)).
36. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 260B.245 subdiv. 1(b) (“A person who was adjudicated

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

11

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 2

780

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:2

persons may be required to submit to DNA testing and
37
fingerprinting. Many employers require job applicants to submit
38
to criminal background checks. If a juvenile’s fingerprints are on
39
file, then the record may come up. Despite traditional provisions
40
regarding the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings, adjudicated
juveniles may have their identities entered into police intelligence
41
databases, such as gang membership databases. In certain cases,
an adjudication of delinquency may affect eligibility for public
42
housing and other benefits. Adjudications may factor into judicial
43
determination of “patterned sex offenders” and require lifetime
44
registration as predatory offenders.

delinquent for . . . a crime of violence . . . is not entitled to ship, transport, possess,
or receive a firearm for the remainder of the person's lifetime.”).
37. E.g., id. § 299C.105, subdiv. 1(a)(3) (stating that juvenile detention
facilities shall take biological specimens for DNA testing).
38. See James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and
Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 185 (2007–
2008) (noting that private providers of background checks to clients, such as
employers, are thriving); Kristen A. Williams, Employing Ex-Offenders: Shifting the
Evaluation of Workplace Risks and Opportunities from Employers to Corrections, 55 UCLA
L. REV. 521, 535 (2007) (“[E]mployers are increasingly turning to background
checks to screen out potentially dangerous employees.”).
39. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 5038(d), (f) (2006) (providing that in some
circumstances, where a juvenile is prosecuted as an adult or after his or her
thirteenth birthday, he or she shall be fingerprinted and photographed); 43 C.J.S.
Infants § 24 (2010) (“A statute may allow the fingerprinting of a juvenile of a
specified age or older charged with delinquency based on an act that would be a
crime if committed by an adult and it may permit the retention of the fingerprint
records for criminal identification purposes.”).
40. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107 (1979) (noting that
one of the historically important characteristics of a juvenile court proceeding is
its confidentiality, especially shielding the process from the public and media in
order to reduce stigma on the juvenile).
41. MINN. STAT. § 299C.091, subdiv. 1.
42. Public housing authorities have the right to evict families of delinquent
children, even if their delinquent conduct does not occur on public housing
property. See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 133–36
(2002).
43. See MINN. STAT. § 243.166, subdiv. 1b(a)(4).
44. Id. subdiv. 6(d).
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The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines allow consideration of a
45
Judges may use juvenile
juvenile record in sentencing adults.
adjudications in sentencing; however, getting more time for a
felony conviction is fundamentally different from changing a
46
maximum ninety-day sentence to a five-year prison sentence.
These are just some of the ways in which juvenile adjudications can
plague one into adulthood. Without efforts to mitigate deficits
both inherent (the juvenile mind and social development) and
transitory (adequate funding to train and supply juvenile
47
defenders), society will find increasingly damaging consequences.

45. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.B.401 (2010), available at
http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/guide10.pdf. The comments to the
provision state:
The juvenile history item is included in the criminal history index to
identify those young adult felons whose criminal careers were preceded
by repeated felony-type offenses committed as a juvenile.
The
Commission held several public hearings devoted to the issue of using
juvenile records in the criminal history index. Those hearings pointed
out differences in legal procedures and safeguards between adult and
juvenile courts, differing availability of juvenile records, and differing
procedures among juvenile courts. As a result of these issues, the
Commission originally decided to establish rigorous standards regulating
the consideration of juvenile records in computing the criminal history
score.
Id. at 16–17.
46. For violation of the felony domestic abuse statute, Minnesota law
provides:
[W]hoever violates the provisions of this section or section 609.224,
subdivision 1, within ten years of the first of any combination of two or
more previous qualified domestic violence-related offense convictions or
adjudications of delinquency is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced
to imprisonment for not more than five years or payment of a fine of not
more than $10,000, or both.
MINN. STAT. § 609.2242, subdiv. 4.
47. Charles Joseph Hynes, Reducing Collateral Consequences of Juvenile Delinquency
Adjudications, 2010 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. 102A, available at http://www.abanet.org
/leadership/2010/midyear/daily_jourmal/102A.pdf. The ABA report expresses
the Bar’s concern regarding the increased breadth and severity of collateral
consequences to juvenile adjudications:
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges federal, state,
territorial and local governments to increase the opportunities of youth
involved with the juvenile or criminal justice systems and to prevent the
continuing discrimination against those who have been involved with
these systems in the past by limiting the collateral consequences of
juvenile arrests, adjudications, and convictions.
Id.
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III. COLLATERAL ATTACK OF PRIOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS
This section of the article examines the case law regarding
collateral attack of juvenile adjudications in subsequent
prosecutions. In DW’s case, weaknesses in the available juvenile
court records exposed the enhancement element of the complaint
to collateral attack. DW disputed probable cause for the offense
based upon a challenge to the prior adjudications. After spotting
the issue, we needed a way to challenge the prior adjudications. No
reported Minnesota case directly addressed prior adjudications
used to enhance the charge. However, prior convictions have been
used to enhance a sentence, and have been accepted as an exception
48
to the proof requirements established in Apprendi v. New Jersey.
Minnesota accepts that prior convictions used to enhance felony
49
sentencing generally are not subject to collateral attack. We filed
a probable cause challenge for a pretrial hearing to the court,
which avoided allowing the jury to hear about the prior conviction.
If the court ruled against DW, we could stipulate to the
enhancement and still keep knowledge of the priors from the jury.
A. The Development of Minnesota Law on Collateral Attack
As in most jurisdictions, the collateral attack of prior
50
convictions has a long and complicated history in Minnesota law.
As a general rule, a criminal defendant’s prior convictions are
presumptively valid; thus, a trial court “need not review the

48. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301
(2004).
49. State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Minn. 2006) (“The Apprendi/Blakely
rule requires that facts used to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the
statutory maximum provided for the offense must be found by a jury or admitted
by the defendant. Prior convictions are a well-recognized exception to the rule.”
(citations omitted)); State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 323 (Minn. 2005) (“[I]t
appears that, after Blakely, the prior conviction exception recognized in Apprendi
retains validity . . . .”).
50. In State v. Cook, 275 Minn. 571, 572, 148 N.W.2d 368, 369–70 (1967), the
court refused to reverse a conviction for an offense enhanced by the action of the
Department of Motor Vehicles. The court reasoned that the defendant had the
right to a hearing on the order, and “[u]nder well-settled principles” he may not
collaterally attack the order. Id. at 369. The decision does not cite any Minnesota
authority on the law, but does cite out-of-state cases.
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procedures that led to [the] prior conviction.” Because collateral
attacks on prior convictions “weaken the finality of judgments,”
52
they are allowed only in unique cases. Over time, the “unique
53
case” standard eroded to protect only uncounseled pleas. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that Minnesota law
extends the right to counsel beyond the dictates of the federal
54
constitution to any case that may lead to incarceration.
In Nordstrom, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a
Wisconsin criminal conviction in which the defendant was not
represented by counsel could not be used to enhance a subsequent
DWI offense to a gross misdemeanor if the right to counsel was not
55
properly waived.
The Nordstrom court was concerned that an
accused person may be incarcerated without the assistance of
56
Its reasoning rested on
counsel to present potential defenses.
federal law stating that a person may collaterally attack a prior
conviction on constitutional grounds and have it invalidated in a
subsequent proceeding for the purposes of an enhanced penalty
57
statute.
As recently as 2006, the Nordstrom rule had become articulated
as, “the defendant cannot collaterally attack the validity of those
prior convictions except by showing that the other state lacked
jurisdiction or that the recognition of the conviction would
improperly interfere with important interests of the State of
58
Minnesota.” In Schmidt, the supreme court reiterated the central
holding of Nordstrom—that a criminal defendant may collaterally
attack a prior Minnesota conviction on the ground that it arose
59
from an uncounseled plea of guilty. The Nordstrom rule applies
51. State v. Warren, 419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1988).
52. Id. (“Ordinarily, in computing a criminal history score, the sentencing
court need not review the procedures that led to a prior conviction and a
collateral attack will be allowed only in ‘unique cases.’” (quoting State v. Edmison,
379 N.W.2d 85, 86 (Minn. 1985))); see also Pilger v. State, 337 N.W.2d 695, 698
(Minn. 1983) (“There may be cases in which the sentencing court, in determining
the defendant’s criminal history score, should look at the procedures that led to
the prior conviction.”).
53. See, e.g., State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 904–05 (Minn. 1983)
(holding that a prior uncounseled DWI guilty plea could not be used to convert
the second DWI offense into a misdemeanor).
54. See id.
55. Id. at 905.
56. See id. at 904.
57. Id. (citing Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980)).
58. State v. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Minn. 2006).
59. Id. at 533 (citing Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d at 905).
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only if the uncounseled guilty plea was obtained in violation of a
60
person’s constitutional rights. The Schmidt court observed that
the unconstitutional “‘failure to appoint counsel [is] a unique
constitutional defect’ that presents a jurisdictional issue that can
61
always be raised by collateral challenge.” Although in Schmidt the
defendant lost his argument that his DWI charge could not be
enhanced by a prior, uncounseled chemical test, the court affirmed
the collateral attack of prior convictions for enhancement under
62
limited and compelling circumstances.
There was some confusion over the status of the Nordstrom rule
due to the overruling of a federal case that had provided some of
63
the rationale for the decision.
The rationale for permitting
collateral attacks on prior convictions used for enhancement
purposes recognized in Nordstrom was weakened by the 1994 United
64
States Supreme Court opinion, Nichols v. United States, which
65
overruled Baldasar. Yet, despite the lack of a clear rationale for
60. See State v. Dumas, 587 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (“[W]e
read Nordstrom as prohibiting the use of a prior unconstitutionally obtained
conviction to enhance a subsequent charge.”).
61. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d at 534 (quoting Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485,
493–96 (1994)).
62. Id. The court opined:
Schmidt essentially argues that the collateral attack procedure permitted
in Nordstrom and Warren should be available for a prior conviction that
was obtained in violation of our decision in Friedman that the Minnesota
Constitution provides a right to counsel for a DWI test decision. But
Nordstrom and Warren do not support collateral attack in this case for
several reasons. First, each involved the effects of a prior Minnesota
conviction. Second, each involved the more fundamental decision to
plead guilty to a charge and, thus, waive the whole array of trial rights. In
contrast, the Friedman right to counsel is described as a “limited right”
applicable to the decision to participate in a chemical test during a police
traffic investigation. Thus, the precise issue is whether Nordstrom and
Warren should be extended to include the limited right to counsel that
exists in Minnesota for test decisions and to apply to convictions
rendered in another state where no equivalent right to counsel exists.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
63. See State v. Dukowitz, No. C4-01-856, 2002 WL 338296, at *1 n.1 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2002) (internal citations omitted) (“The continuing vitality of the
Nordstrom holding that a prior misdemeanor conviction may be collaterally
attacked and invalidated for enhancement purposes is subject to question. . . . For
[the] purpose of our analysis, we assume without deciding that Nordstrom
continues to represent Minnesota law.”).
64. 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
65. Similarly, in Dumas, the Minnesota Court of Appeals stated:
Initially, we note that the continuing vitality of Nordstrom may be subject
to question. The Nordstrom court relied in part on the reasoning of the
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permitting a defendant to collaterally attack a revocation in a
subsequent enhancement proceeding, the appellate court has
adhered to the assumption that such a collateral attack is permitted
66
in some circumstances, and not merely for uncounseled pleas.
B. The McFee Problem
67

In State v. McFee, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
juvenile adjudications fall within the prior conviction exception to
the Apprendi/Blakely rule and may be used in calculating a criminal
history score without submitting the facts of the adjudication to a
68
jury. McFee notes that Minnesota courts have long approved the
use of prior juvenile adjudications in calculating a defendant’s
69
criminal history score under the Sentencing Guidelines. In McFee,
the defendant sought review of his sentence on the grounds that
70
the sentencing court violated Blakely by using prior juvenile
71
adjudications in computing his criminal history score. He alleged

United States Supreme Court in Baldasar v. Illinois. Baldasar, however,
has been overruled by Nichols v. United States. Because the Minnesota
Supreme Court has not addressed Nordstrom since Nichols was decided, we
assume for purposes of our analysis that Nordstrom continues to represent
the law in Minnesota.
Dumas, 587 N.W.2d at 302 (internal citations omitted).
66. See State v. Mellet, 642 N.W.2d 779, 788–89 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), review
denied (Minn. July 16, 2002).
67. 721 N.W.2d 607 (Minn. 2006).
68. Id. at 619; accord State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 323 (Minn. 2005)
(“[A]fter Blakely, the prior conviction exception recognized in Apprendi retains
vitality and it is constitutional for a defendant’s sentence to be increased based on
a prior conviction without submitting the fact of the conviction to the jury.”); State
v. Allen, 706 N.W.2d 40, 48 (Minn. 2005) (rejecting the claim that the assignment
of a custody status point does not fall within the prior-conviction exception); State
v. Turnball, 766 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
69. McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 614–15.
70. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 296 (2004) (holding that any facts,
except a prior conviction, that may be used to increase a sentence beyond a
“statutory maximum,” which may include a presumptive guidelines sentence, must
be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the defendant stipulates to
the facts or waives the right to a jury trial as to those facts and submits them to the
judge for decision).
71. McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 609. In 1980, “Minnesota became the first state to
adopt legally-binding sentencing guidelines, and it was the first state to employ a
permanent, independent sentencing commission to develop and monitor the
implementation of guidelines and make other recommendations related to
sentencing.” Richard Frase, Sentencing Policy and Criminal Justice in Minnesota: Past,
Present, and Future, COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUST., http://www.crimeandjustice.org
/councilinfo.cfm?pID=52 (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).
Minnesota uses a
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a Sixth Amendment and Due Process violation because juvenile
adjudications are not “criminal convictions” and also juveniles do
72
not enjoy a right to a jury trial. Following an extensive review of
case precedent and the history of the juvenile court system,
highlighting the latter’s original rehabilitative purpose and the
change to promoting public safety and reducing juvenile
delinquency, the court concluded:
Absent clear direction from the United States Supreme
Court, we will not upset our precedent upholding the use
of juvenile criminal behavior in sentencing and the
carefully-balanced approach the legislature ratified in the
Guidelines for use of juvenile adjudications in calculating
criminal history score. In sum, we hold that it is not
inconsistent with the legislature’s purpose in maintaining
the juvenile justice system for sentencing courts to use
prior juvenile adjudications in calculating criminal history
73
under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.
McFee seemed to present an insurmountable barrier against
attacking the juvenile adjudications, except in “unique cases,”
74
which had come to mean only uncounseled pleas. However, the

“guidelines” approach in felony sentencing. See generally Frequently Asked Questions,
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/msgc5
/faqs.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2010). A defendant’s prior convictions and custody
status give the defendant a “criminal history score” and each offense a severity
ranking. Id. The score and ranking combine on a “sentencing guidelines grid” to
determine a range of months to serve. Id. The Guidelines are promulgated
annually by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, which updates the
guidelines with any legislative changes and case law analysis or direction from the
appellate courts. See id. The commission also receives notice from trial courts for
every sentence which deviates from the guidelines, with written grounds
articulated by the judge. See id. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission provides the following answer to the question “What are the
Sentencing Guidelines?”:
The [Sentencing Guidelines Commission] embod[ies] the goals of the
criminal justice system as determined by the citizens of [our] state
through their elected representatives. This system promotes uniform
and proportional sentences for convicted felons and helps to ensure that
sentencing decisions are not influenced by factors such as race, gender,
or the exercise of constitutional rights by the defendant. The guidelines
serve as a model for the criminal justice system as a whole to aspire to, as
well as provide a standard to measure how well the system is working.
Id.
72. McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 611.
73. Id. at 615.
74. In State v. Schmidt, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained that
“collaterally attacking the underlying conviction is [a procedure] that we have
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McFee decision only reached the question of juvenile court trials.
The court left unchallenged the presumption of the accuracy of
the fact of adjudication as well as the reliability of the juvenile court
process.
The McFee case should not be considered as controlling the
issue presented in DW’s case. There, the defendant challenged the
use of juvenile adjudications to enhance his sentence, not enhance
76
charging.
The difference may seem sublime, but nevertheless
remains essential. As a sentencing issue, the McFee court focused
on the use of adjudications in computing a criminal history score as
77
a matter of recidivism. The court noted: “The question presented
here is whether his choice to recidivate is relevant to his sentence.
We believe, as we have said before, that such behavior, even though
committed by a juvenile, is appropriately considered when
78
sentencing the offender as an adult.”
C. The Custis Problem
In Custis—cited by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Schmidt as
authority from the federal courts over federal constitutional
79
protections —the United States Supreme Court also observed that
collateral attacks may only be allowed in cases where the right to

authorized on a narrow basis for uncounseled plea agreements.” 712 N.W.2d 530,
533 (Minn. 2006). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly
limited such collateral attacks to the complete denial of counsel, as distinguished
even from other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Custis v. United States, 511
U.S. 485, 496–97 (1994) (stating that the “failure to appoint counsel for an
indigent defendant was a unique constitutional defect” and limiting the authority
to collaterally attack prior convictions to situations in which there was a complete
denial of counsel, distinguishing this defect from other constitutional infirmities
such as ineffective assistance of counsel and the failure to assure that a guilty plea
was voluntary). The Schmidt court cited Custis approvingly. See Schmidt, 712
N.W.2d at 538 n.4.
75. McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 616–17 (“[Petitioner] does not dispute that he
received all the process and protections that were due to him in connection with
his juvenile cases.”).
76. Id. at 609.
77. Id. at 615.
78. Id. (citing State v. Peterson, 331 N.W.2d 483, 484 (Minn. 1983) (holding
that “it was not error” for district court to “assign defendant one point for his
juvenile record” when calculating his criminal history score)); see also Jackson v.
State, 329 N.W.2d 66, 67 (Minn. 1983) (noting that defendant’s long juvenile
record could be used as a basis for dispositional departure under the Guidelines).
79. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d at 534 (citing Custis, 511 U.S. at 496).
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80

counsel has been denied.
The Custis Court recognized that
“failure to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant was a unique
constitutional defect” which could always be raised as a
81
jurisdictional defect. The Court then limited collateral attack to
uncounseled pleas (which it calls a Gideon issue), even in the case of
82
other claimed constitutional defects. However, the Custis Court’s
Gideon limitation need not control Minnesota law.
Custis did not intend to establish a change in substantive
constitutional law. Rather, it set forth a rule of federal criminal
procedure. Justice Ginsburg, who voted with the majority in Custis,
observed the following in Nichols: “Custis presented a forum
question. The issue was where, not whether, the defendant could
83
attack a prior conviction for constitutional infirmity.” Thus, Custis
presented a procedural question and not a substantive question.
The Court’s focus on administrative concerns such as convenience
84
and finality bears this out. Convincingly, the Court concludes by
observing that Custis could seek relief from his allegedly
unconstitutional conviction through habeas corpus in state or
85
federal court. As the California Court of Appeals has stated: “If
the majority in Custis intended the decision to prohibit
constitutional attacks on prior convictions in state courts, assuming
it even has the authority to do so, it would not have allowed Custis
to litigate his constitutional claims through a state habeas corpus
86
proceeding.”
80. Custis, 511 U.S. at 492–93 (explaining the law is well established that, with
the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of a defendant’s right to
counsel, no constitutional violation occurs when a prior conviction, state or
federal, is used to enhance a federal sentence).
81. Id. at 496.
82. Id. The Court concluded that, outside of the right to appointed counsel
as recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), lesser violations of the
federal Constitution (specifically, ineffective assistance of counsel, entry of a plea
that was not knowing and intelligent, or agreement to a stipulated facts trial
without being adequately advised of trial rights) did not rise to the level of a
jurisdictional defect that could be raised by collateral challenge when the
conviction was used to enhance the defendant’s sentence. Custis, 511 U.S. at 496;
see also Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d at 534 (citing Gideon and Custis in addressing whether
a defendant in Minnesota may collaterally challenge the validity of a prior
conviction rendered in another state when the prior conviction is offered to
enhance the defendant’s Minnesota crime).
83. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 765 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
84. See Custis, 511 U.S. at 486, 497.
85. Id. at 497.
86. People v. Soto, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1596, 1603 (1996). As authority, Soto also
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IV. A NEW APPROACH: ATTACKING ENHANCEMENT AS PART OF
PROBABLE CAUSE
DW challenged the enhancement priors in the complaint on
the grounds that the State could not prove that the juvenile courts
had made adjudications of delinquency. The challenge attacked
the validity of the prior juvenile adjudications as part of the
probable cause determination because the priors had been pleaded
as elements of the offense. The issue of probable cause is a matter
87
of jurisdiction. If the state cannot show there is probable cause to
believe the defendant committed a crime, then the court has no
88
jurisdiction over the defendant.
Minnesota has developed a unique approach to litigating
certain trial issues. The rules of court provide for an omnibus
hearing, intended to litigate all pretrial motions as part of an
cites commentators on Custis that have arrived at the same conclusion. Id. at 1603
n.3. (citing Alan C. Smith, More Than a Question of Forum: The Use of Unconstitutional
Convictions To Enhance Sentences Following Custis v. United States, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1323, 1336 (1995); Barry W. Strike, Custis v. United States: Are Unconstitutional
Prior Convictions Being Used To Increase Prison Terms?, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
267, 291–92 (1995)). The Nevada Supreme Court articulated:
[W]e decline this opportunity to adopt such a strict rule limiting
collateral attacks and note that we are not bound by the Custis decision as
it involved a federal sentencing law not at issue here and merely
established the floor for federal constitutional purposes as to when
collateral attacks of prior convictions may be prohibited.
Paschall v. Nevada, 8 P.3d 851, 852 n.2 (Nev. 2000).
87. See State ex rel. Duhn v. Tahash, 275 Minn. 377, 382, 147 N.W.2d 382, 386
(1966); State v. Braggs, 577 N.W.2d 516, 519–20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
88. The Comment to Rule 11 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure
states:
The current statutory hearing on probable cause has been replaced under
these rules by a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable
cause which is to be made in accordance with Rule 10 and heard at the
Omnibus Hearing pursuant to Rule 11.03. If such a motion is made, the
court shall base its probable cause determination upon the evidence set
forth in Rule 18.06, subd. 1. In State v. Florence, 306 Minn. 442, 239
N.W.2d 892 (1976), the Supreme Court discussed the type of evidence
that may be presented and considered on a motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of probable cause. Nothing in that case or in the rule
prohibits a defendant from calling any witness to testify for the purpose
of showing an absence of probable cause. In determining whether to
dismiss a complaint under Rule 11.03 for lack of probable cause, the trial
court is not simply reassessing whether or not probable cause existed to
warrant the arrest. Rather, under Florence the trial court must determine
based upon the facts disclosed by the record whether it is fair and
reasonable to require the defendant to stand trial.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 11 cmt. (2008 Main Volume).
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89

evidentiary, pretrial probable cause hearing. In 1964, the United
States Supreme Court declared that a defendant who challenged
the admissibility of evidence on constitutional grounds “has a due
process right to a reliable determination” that the evidence was
90
obtained without constitutional infringement. In response, the
Minnesota Supreme Court developed a procedure called a
Rasmussen hearing (named for the seminal case) to be followed
with respect to problems of evidence which may arise in connection
with, particularly, searches and seizures and confessions, as well as
91
other constitutional questions. The principles in Rasmussen have
92
been codified in the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Rasmussen hearing is the logical forum in which to litigate
93
whether the state can prove the fact of prior adjudications. The
94
hearing is testimonial but is not held in front of a jury. Also, a
defendant can stipulate to a prior if there is no issue or demand
95
that the prior be proved.
Trial court judges routinely make
89. Id. R. 11. The comment to Rule 11 further provides:
The Omnibus Hearing provided by this rule is divided into three parts: (1)
the Rasmussen hearing (Rule 11.02); (2) the hearing of pretrial motions
of the defendant and prosecution (Rule 11.04); and (3) the hearing on
other pretrial issues brought up on the court’s initiative (Rule 11.04).
The hearings on any of these parts may be combined and heard
simultaneously (Rule 11.07).
90. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 478 (1972) (referencing Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964)).
91. See State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 553–55, 141 N.W.2d
3, 13–14 (1966) (“If the defendant elects to contest the admissibility of the
evidence upon Federal constitutional grounds, a pretrial fact hearing . . . will be
held . . . with a determination by the trial court as to whether the . . . evidence
contested will vitiate defendant’s constitutional rights.”).
92. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 7.01 (codifying the Rasmussen notice); id. R. 11.02
(codifying the Rasmussen hearing).
93. As the court noted:
The procedure which we have outlined deals only with evidence obtained
as the result of a search and seizure and evidence consisting of or
produced by confessions on the part of the defendant. However, the
steps which have been suggested as a method of dealing with evidence of
this type will indicate to counsel and to the trial courts that the pretrial
consideration of other evidentiary problems, the resolution of which is
needed to assure the integrity of the trial when conducted, will be most
useful and that this court encourages the use of such procedures
wherever practical.
Rasmussen, 272 Minn. at 556, 141 N.W.2d at 14–15.
94. 8 HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 16.12 (3d ed. 2009) (explaining that given the nature of the
evidence at issue in a Rasmussen trial, it is heard in the absence of a jury).
95. State v. Berkleman, 355 N.W.2d 394, 396 (Minn. 1984) (explaining that
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findings and conclusions on record at the hearing’s conclusion.
The Rasmussen portion of the trial also serves to litigate
97
suppression issues. If challenged on constitutional grounds, the
state must prove the evidence it seeks to introduce was
98
The constitutional issue affects the
constitutionally obtained.
burden of proof at the trial level, as well as the standard of review
on the appellate level. The trial court’s factual conclusions will be
reversed only where clearly erroneous, but the legal questions will
99
be examined de novo.
The rule that allows, in a “unique case,” a defendant to
collaterally attack prior convictions survived despite the Nichols case
100
and remains good law.
State v. Mellet articulated a two-step
101
The Mellet
process for a defendant to mount a collateral attack.
test states:

defendants may offer to stipulate prior convictions, yet the offer to stipulate does
not necessarily take away the State’s right to present related evidence).
96. See State v. LaFrance, 302 Minn. 245, 246, 223 N.W.2d 813, 814 (1974)
(“The trial court [in cases where evidence at a Rasmussen hearing is conflicting]
acts as finder of facts, deciding for purposes of admissibility which evidence to
believe and whether the state has met its burden of proof.”). On appeal, the
Minnesota Supreme Court will not reverse a trial court’s finding of fact unless it is
clearly erroneous. State v. Stephenson, 310 Minn. 229, 231, 245 N.W.2d 621, 623
(1976).
97. See, e.g., Stephenson, 310 Minn. at 230, 245 N.W.2d at 622 (noting
appellant’s Rasmussen hearing considered a motion to suppress evidence).
98. MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 94, § 16.12.
99. State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. 1992) (citation omitted)
(“Normally, this court will only reverse a pretrial decision of the trial court
suppressing evidence if the State demonstrates ‘clearly and unequivocally that the
trial court has erred in its judgment and that, unless reversed, the error will have a
critical impact on the outcome of the trial.’ However, when reviewing a pretrial
order suppressing evidence where the facts are not in dispute and the trial court’s
decision is a question of law, the reviewing court may independently review the
facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be
suppressed.”); see also State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999) (“When
reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently
review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred
in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”).
100. See State v. Warren, 419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1988) (explaining
collateral attacks are reserved for “unique cases” (quoting State v. Edmison, 379
N.W.2d 85, 86 (Minn. 1985))). But see Nichols v. United States, 511 US 738, 746–
47 (1994) (holding, consistent with Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, that
“uncounseled” misdemeanor convictions, valid due to absence of imposition of
prison term, may be used to enhance punishment at subsequent conviction).
101. State v. Mellet, 642 N.W.2d 779, 789 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
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To properly raise the constitutionality of a [conviction]
and shift the burden of proof to the state, [a defendant]
must (1) promptly notify the state that her constitutional
rights were violated during a prior [case]; and (2)
produce evidence in support of that contention with
102
respect to each challenged [conviction].
In Nordstrom, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that “once a
defendant properly raises the issue of the constitutionality of a
prior conviction, the state then has the burden of proving that the
conviction was obtained consistent with constitutional
103
requirements.”
“[T]he factual ambiguity of delinquency adjudications
sometimes makes it difficult for criminal courts to determine for
what offense the juvenile court actually convicted a youth when it
uses those convictions for sentence enhancements or other
104
collateral purposes.” Two of DW’s adjudications could not be
proved to be legal. Therefore, DW challenged probable cause for
the enhancement.
As charged under the enhancement provision of the assault
statute, the proof of qualified prior adjudications must be
105
As an element, like any
considered an element of the offense.
other element, the enhancement must be subject to a probable
106
cause challenge, and proved as part of the omnibus hearing.
Every element of a criminal charge must be proved beyond a
107
reasonable doubt.
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee
108
the right to a jury trial in a criminal case. A defendant’s right to a
jury trial includes the right to be tried on every element of the
109
charged offense. When stipulating to an element of the offense,

102. Id. (quotation omitted). The Mellet procedure has been approved in
unpublished opinions. E.g., State v. Holman, No. A07–1443, 2008 WL 4628407, at
*8 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2008); State v. Patrick, No. A07–1370, 2008 WL
4006724, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2008).
103. Mellet, 642 N.W.2d at 789 (citing State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 905
(Minn. 1983)).
104. Feld, supra note 20, at 1185–86.
105. See MINN. STAT. § 609.224 (2008).
106. See State v. Florence, 306 Minn. 442, 446, 239 N.W.2d 892, 896 (1976).
107. State v. Bluhm, 457 N.W.2d 256, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part on other grounds, 460 N.W.2d 22 (Minn. 1990).
108. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6; see also MINN. R. CRIM. P.
26.01, subdiv. 1(1).
109. Bluhm, 457 N.W.2d at 260.
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a defendant effectively waives the right to a jury trial on that
element and removes evidence regarding that element from the
110
jury’s consideration. Consequently, a defendant must personally
waive a jury trial on the element in writing or on the record in
open court before stipulating at trial to any elements of an
111
offense.
When the prior conviction is uncontroverted, a
stipulation generally is perceived as beneficial to the defendant
because it effectively removes potentially prejudicial evidence from
112
the jury’s consideration. Nevertheless, the prior conviction is an
essential element of the crime.
The McFee court ruled that the fact of prior juvenile
adjudications need not be submitted to the jury to vindicate a
113
defendant’s right to trial by jury. In his appeal, McFee suggested
that the proof of prior adjudications be submitted as a jury
114
question.
The court rejected this argument, stating, “[a]s we
noted in Allen, this type of review is properly performed by the
115
district court without need of jury fact finding.” The McFee court
suggested that this may be accomplished by examination of the
116
juvenile court records. This suggestion returns us to the essential
problem in DW’s case: the uncertainty in the record of the fact of
conviction, as well as the obvious unreliability of the due process
protections actually observed.
DW’s prior adjudications presented a probable cause issue in
the traditional sense. The state could not prove the actual
adjudications—Apprendi’s “fact of adjudication” standard.

110. State v. Berkleman, 355 N.W.2d 394, 397 n.2 (Minn. 1984).
111. State v. Fluker, 781 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (citing MINN.
R. CRIM. P. 26.01, subdiv. 1(2)(a)).
112. Berkleman, 355 N.W.2d at 397.
113. State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Minn. 2006) (explaining appellant’s
argument that juvenile adjudications do not fall within the Apprendi exception
and, thus, must be submitted to a jury for sentencing decisions).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 618 (citing State v. Allen, 706 N.W.2d 40, 48 (Minn. 2005)).
116. Allen, 706 N.W.2d at 48 (“Like the fact or character of a prior conviction,
a defendant’s custody status can be determined by reviewing court records relating
to that conviction.”).
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V. USING PRIOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS AS AN ELEMENT TO
ENHANCE CRIMINAL OFFENSES OFFENDS DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS
As part of the probable cause challenge, DW fought the
enhancement as a violation of his constitutional rights. At each of
DW’s juvenile hearings, most procedural formalities had been
observed, including his right to a lawyer. However, in reviewing the
proceedings, it became clear that the attention paid to DW focused
on what to do with DW—on social work rather than criminal
justice. This section of the article defends the premise that
charging a person with a felony based on adjudications made when
117
as young as ten years of age violates due process. Juvenile
adjudications do not guarantee reliability of the outcome; juvenile
court practice elevates procedural due process formalities over
substantive due process.
A. Finding an Issue of Constitutional Dimension
A due process challenge to the use of prior adjudications
presents an issue of constitutional dimension. When faced with
constitutional issues, a trial court will exact closer scrutiny of
government actions, and an appellate court will apply the highest
118
standard of review.
Thus, the most effective pretrial challenges
find some kind of constitutional protection.
Similar to standards of review, “[s]tandards of proof—
preponderance, clear and convincing, beyond a reasonable
117. Minnesota juvenile delinquency jurisdiction extends to children as young
as ten years old. See MINN. STAT. §§ 260C.007, 260C.101 (2008) (explaining that
juvenile jurisdiction reaches children under the age of eighteen with some
exceptions). Generally, children under ten who commit delinquent acts are
treated as “children in need of protection and services” (commonly referred to as
“CHIPS”) under section 260C.007, subdivision 6, of the Minnesota Statutes.
However, Minnesota’s largest county, Hennepin, received money for a “Targeted
Early Intervention” program to research offenders under ten. See MICHELLE
DECKER GERRARD & GREG OWEN, DELINQUENTS UNDER 10: TARGETED EARLY
INTERVENTION 1 (2000), available at http://www.wilder.org/download.0.html?report
=1142&summary=1. A December 2000 report which described the program noted
a median age of 8.8 years for children identified as first-time offenders in the
program at that time. Id. at 2.
118. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. & JANE B. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS JURISDICTION AND
PRACTICE § 5.13 (3d ed. 1999) (“When a constitutional question is present, the
appellate court should be . . . much less deferential to the . . . lower court whose
action it is reviewing. . . . [A]ppellate courts often will make a de novo review not
only of the constitutional claim but also of the factual basis upon which it is said to
rest.”).
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doubt—reflect society’s interests in the correct outcome of cases.”
[S]ociety’s interest in the outcomes of criminal cases is
regarded as quite high, and the trier of fact is asked to be
satisfied “beyond a reasonable doubt,” the highest
standard of proof.
The disutility of convicting an
innocent person is viewed as being much greater than the
disutility of freeing a guilty one; hence, the probability of
120
error is intentionally weighted in the defendant’s favor.
B. A Constitutional Theory: Due Process and the “Fact of Conviction”

The cases considering the use of prior juvenile adjudications
have arisen as part of sentencing issues, rather than the use of a
prior adjudication as an element of the crime itself. One
theoretical rationale for the prior convictions exclusion relies on
the “fact of conviction.” DW disputed the “fact” of adjudication.
As observed by the McFee court, the defendants in the
121
underlying cases never disputed the fact of their conviction. The
McFee court held that the use of prior convictions did not offend
“the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise
implicated in allowing a judge to determine a ‘fact’ increasing
punishment beyond the maximum of the statutory range” because
the defendant in that case did not contest the accuracy of the “fact”
122
of his prior convictions.
DW challenged the “fact” of the prior
adjudications used to enhance the charge from a misdemeanor to a
felony. A review of the juvenile court records revealed that not all
of the “certified adjudications” accurately reflect what actually took

119. Feld, supra note 20, at 1125 n.34.
120. Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of
Standards of Proof, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 161 (1985); see generally Dorothy K.
Kagehiro, Defining the Standards of Proof in Jury Instructions, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. 194
(1990) (discussing a research study examining juror comprehension of both legal
and quantified definitions of standards of proof and the impact of jury
instructions on verdicts).
121. State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 610–11 (Minn. 2006). The court stated:
The [Apprendi] Court also noted that “the due process and Sixth
Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to
determine a ‘fact’ increasing punishment beyond the maximum of the
statutory range” were “mitigated” in Almendarez-Torres because
“procedural safeguards attached to any ‘fact’ of prior conviction,” and
because the defendant in that case did not contest the accuracy of the “fact” of his
prior convictions.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000)).
122. Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488).
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place at the hearings. The certified copies of conviction, as
submitted by the prosecutor, did not reveal these problems.
Without proving legal prior adjudications, the enhancement
violated DW’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
Not all juvenile court petitions end as actual adjudications of
delinquency. For example, the dispositional provisions allow but
do not require a district court to continue a case without
adjudicating a child delinquent “when it is in the best interests of
123
the child and the protection of the public to do so.” Similarly, a
district court may continue a juvenile delinquency case without
adjudicating a child delinquent “[w]hen it is in the best interests of
the child to do so and when the child has admitted the allegations
124
contained in the petition before the judge.”
This is what
happened in DW’s case; the judge accepted his admission, but did
not find him delinquent.
DW challenged the fact of adjudication for the assault from
March 21, 2002. In that case DW admitted the facts in Hennepin
County, but venue changed to Ramsey County for disposition.
Unfortunately, no record exists for review in Hennepin County.
There are no hearing transcripts, court reporter’s recordings, or
steno notes. Only one juvenile court document, captioned
125
“ORDER,” is available for review.
The order says DW appeared March 25th, represented by
counsel. Before the hearing, DW met with a public defender in the
detention facility. This lawyer, assigned to represent all the
children appearing that day on a “Detention Calendar,” would have
explained to DW his rights at the hearing and what the judge
would consider in deciding whether to release or hold DW. They
would have discussed the facts of the case, especially since DW
intended to admit the petition. They also would have tried to find

123. MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 15.05, subdiv. 4(A).
124. MINN. STAT. § 260B.198, subdiv. 7 (2008); see In re Welfare of J.R.Z., 648
N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasizing permissive language in
statute), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002). These provisions give a district court
broad discretion in deciding whether to adjudicate delinquency or continue a case
without adjudication. Id. at 244. They require neither that a district court make
particularized findings when making the decision nor that it take the “least drastic
step necessary to restore law-abiding conduct in the juvenile.” Id. at 245
(quotation omitted); see also id. at 245–46 (distinguishing decision to adjudicate
from decision to impose particular disposition).
125. The “Order” records the case pedigree, appearances, and some notes on
proceedings.
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some alternative to detention. At the hearing, DW waived his right
to have a parent present. He also waived his trial rights, “admitted”
the assault, and established a factual basis. The county reduced the
charge to simple assault in exchange for the admission. The judge
accepted the waivers and admission, but did not make any findings.
DW appeared on two different delinquency petitions at that
disposition hearing. The transcript referenced two files with
different dates and case numbers. However, the order stated only
that “[t]he child is adjudicated delinquent” without specifying
which petition. As noted at the outset of the article, the judge
ordered:
DW, I’m going to follow the recommendations of
probation. I’m going to order that you be placed in the
[name withheld] group home for a period of nine to
twelve months, that you attend outpatient sexual-offender
treatment as directed by probation, that you attend your
psychiatric appointments and follow the medication
orders, that you perform 24 hours of community work
service, that you make restitution. I am going to—you will
be adjudicated for this offense at this time given the
nature of the offenses.
In the Placement Order, the judge made no findings of fact
specifically designating either petition. In the order portion, there
is a single adjudication of delinquency, once again, without
reference to files or facts. Juvenile adjudications may not be made
without “due caution and scrupulous professional dignity” because
written dispositional findings are essential to meaningful appellate
review and failure to make sufficient written findings constitutes
126
reversible error.
DW was never adjudicated delinquent in the petition alleging
the assault from July 31, 1992. At the various hearings on the
petition, the judge never actually made a finding or adjudication of
delinquency. A mere entry of an admission or finding of guilt is
not the same as an adjudication in the way a plea might be
considered in criminal court. The rules of juvenile court require
127
entry of an order specifying adjudication of delinquency. In the
126. In re Welfare of N.T.K., 619 N.W.2d 209, 211–12 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000);
see also MINN. STAT. § 260B.198, subdiv. 1; MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2
(setting out requirement of findings).
127. Rule 15.05 states:
On each of the charges found by the court to be proved, the court shall
either:
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Disposition Order, the judge “continue[d] the case for review and
[placed] the child on probation.” The court never entered a
finding of delinquency, so there was no “adjudication.”
C. A Constitutional Theory: Due Process and “Reliability of Convictions”
The Apprendi Court’s holding is quite straightforward: “Other
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
128
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Courts should exclude satisfied prior convictions if they come with
guarantees of reliability inherent in the truth-finding engine of
129
criminal trials.
Apprendi emphasized that “the requirements of
trying to a jury all facts necessary to constitute a statutory offense,
and proving those facts beyond reasonable doubt” constituted
130
essential elements of due process. Apprendi exempted the “fact of
a prior conviction” because criminal defendants enjoyed a
constitutional right to a jury trial for the prior conviction, which
131
assured accuracy and reliability. To meet due process:
[P]ractice must at least adhere to the basic principles
undergirding the requirements of trying to a jury all facts
necessary to constitute a statutory offense, and proving
those facts beyond reasonable doubt. As we made clear in
Winship, the “reasonable doubt” requirement “has [a] vital
role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons.”
Prosecution subjects the criminal defendant both to “the
possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction
and . . . the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction.”
We thus require this, among other,
procedural protections in order to “provid[e] concrete

(A) adjudicate the child delinquent pursuant to Minnesota Statutes,
section 260B.198, subdivision 1; or
(B) continue the case without adjudicating the child delinquent and
order a disposition pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, section 260B.198,
subdivisions 1(a) or (b).
The adjudication or continuance without adjudication shall occur at the
same time and in the same court order as the disposition.
MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 15.05, subdiv. 1.
128. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
129. See id. at 476.
130. Id. at 483–84.
131. Id. at 496; see also Courtney P. Fain, What’s In a Name? The Worrisome
Interchange of Juvenile “Adjudications” with Criminal “Convictions”, 49 B.C. L. REV. 495,
511 (2008).
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substance for the presumption of innocence,” and to
reduce the risk of imposing such deprivations
132
erroneously.
Similarly, the McFee court approved using juvenile
adjudications based on this same thesis that procedural safeguards
133
In response to the argument that
attach to prior conviction.
juvenile adjudications lack the right to a jury trial, the McFee court
focused on reliability and the due process requirements attached to
134
juvenile proceedings.
Recognizing that a jury trial is not
constitutionally required in juvenile proceedings, the court stated
that “‘[j]uvenile adjudications, where juvenile defendants have the
right to notice, the right to counsel, the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the
right to a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, provide
more than sufficient safeguards to ensure the reliability that
135
Apprendi requires . . . .’”
The procedural safeguards the McFee
court envisioned hardly seem evident in DW’s adjudications. DW
contested the efficacy of the “procedural safeguards” afforded
juveniles through the juvenile court system.
Apprendi and McFee presume that the due process guarantees
actually result in reliable adjudications. The Apprendi Court
exempted any “fact of a prior conviction” because the defendant
was presumptively afforded due process in the trial that culminated
136
in the conviction, therefore making it accurate and reliable. The
McFee court’s decision presumes reliability attached to prior
137
convictions.
The Apprendi Court specifically noted that prior
convictions are valid in part because of the defendant’s right to jury
trial and the prosecutor’s burden of proving guilt beyond a
138
reasonable doubt. The Court pointed to its recent decision that
proposed:

132. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483–84 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363
(1970)).
133. State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 610–11, 615 (Minn. 2006) (examining
Almendarez-Torres and Apprendi).
134. Id. at 616.
135. Id. (quoting United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190 (11th Cir.
2005)).
136. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496.
137. McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 616.
138. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
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One basis for that possible constitutional distinctiveness is
not hard to see: unlike virtually any other consideration
used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense, and
certainly unlike the factor before us in this case, a prior
conviction must itself have been established through
procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt,
139
and jury trial guarantees.
The McFee court decided that “McFee received all of the
protections to which he was constitutionally entitled when he was
140
adjudicated delinquent.” However, juvenile adjudications do not
meet this high standard.
Without guarantees of reliability,
enhancing an offense with juvenile adjudications violates
constitutional guarantees of due process, fundamental fairness, and
protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
The due process guarantees that ensure the fairness of
convictions in adult court do not function the same way in juvenile
adjudications. Too many methods, procedures, and practices
common to juvenile court systems with their overriding concern for
“the welfare of the child” actually conspire against accuracy in
deciding guilt. Among these deficits are: the prevalence of pleas in
juvenile court, the inhibitions juveniles feel against vigorously
defending themselves, the lack of a right to a jury trial, poor
delivery of legal services, adjudications by referees, and little post141
conviction review by juveniles.
The juvenile court is not a
142
criminal court. Although increasingly punitive, the juvenile
139. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999). The Apprendi Court
noted that its holding was “foreshadowed” by the Court’s 1999 opinion in Jones
“that ‘under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and
jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment any fact (other than prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an
indictment . . . and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 476. (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6). “In Jones, the Court distinguished
prior convictions from other factors, noting that prior convictions must have been
established through procedures which satisfied the guarantees of fair notice,
reasonable doubt, and the jury trial.” Fain, supra note 131, at 528 n.3 (citing Jones,
526 U.S. at 249).
140. McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 616.
141. See generally Fain, supra note 131 (arguing that it is improper to equate
juvenile delinquency adjudications with criminal convictions for these very
reasons).
142. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:
2006 NATIONAL REPORT 96–97 (2006) (noting that many state legislatures have
made it easier to transfer juvenile offenders into the adult criminal justice system,
sentencing options have been increased and expanded to include punitive aspects,
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courts’ stated goal continues to be rehabilitative.
The Apprendi Court’s premise that using prior juvenile
adjudications to enhance sentences is without constitutional defect
has not gone unchallenged. Since the Court decided Apprendi,
courts that have considered this issue have gone either way, but
“the majority of courts that have addressed the issue we face here
have held that juvenile adjudications fall within the prior
144
conviction exception.”
The McFee court explored the rationale
presented by both sides, and, as noted, felt satisfied that juvenile
adjudications “provide more than sufficient safeguards to ensure
145
the reliability that Apprendi requires.”
146
In United States v. Tighe, a Ninth Circuit panel held that a
sentencing court could not use prior nonjury juvenile adjudications
147
to increase a defendant’s sentence above the statutory maximum.
The Tighe court reasoned that the basis for the prior conviction
exception in Apprendi was that the procedural safeguards of a jury
trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the defendant’s prior
148
trial satisfied his or her Sixth Amendment rights.
Quoting
Apprendi, the Tighe court states:
There is a vast difference between accepting the
validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in
a proceeding in which the defendant had the right
to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and
allowing the judge to find the required fact under a
149
lesser standard of proof.

and confidentiality laws have been relaxed), available at http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov
/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf.
143. See, e.g., Fain, supra note 131, at 528 n.178 (citing several cases which note
the rehabilitative goal of juvenile court).
144. McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 616.
145. Id. (quoting United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190 (11th Cir. 2005))
(citation omitted).
146. 266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001).
147. Id. at 1193–94.
148. Id. at 1194.
149. Id. (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496 (2000)).
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The court held that this justification did not apply to a defendant
150
in a juvenile adjudication who did not have a right to a jury trial.
Accordingly, such adjudications could not enhance a sentence
beyond the statutory maximum.
“[T]he ‘prior conviction’
exception to Apprendi’s general rule must be limited to prior
convictions that were themselves obtained through proceedings
that included the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a
151
reasonable doubt.”
152
In United States v. Jones, the Third Circuit took the opposite
view, holding prior nonjury juvenile adjudications could be used
153
The Jones court accepted the
for sentence enhancements.
Apprendi (and McFee) premise that the defendant “received all
process that was due when convicted—for adults that includes the
154
right to a jury trial; for juveniles, it does not.” The court relied on
the fact that under McKeiver, due process does not entitle juvenile
155
defendants to a jury trial. Accordingly, because the adjudications
complied with what the Constitution required at the time of the
conviction, the court saw no problem with using them at a later
156
time as a prior conviction.
Of the two approaches, the Tighe court’s reasoning appears
closer to recognizing the emphasis that the United States Supreme
Court has placed on the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee in
sentencing since the Apprendi decision. Tighe recognized the
exceptional nature of the use of prior convictions under Apprendi—
that they are only considered because of the procedural safeguards
157
provided in the prior trial. Conversely, Jones relied on McKeiver’s
holding that jury trials are not required in juvenile proceedings;
however, McKeiver had to do with maintaining the rehabilitative
158
and diagnostic functions of the juvenile system.
That court did
150. Id.; see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (holding
that juvenile court proceedings are not criminal prosecutions within reach of the
Sixth Amendment guaranteeing right to an impartial jury in all criminal
prosecutions); accord McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 612 (referencing the holding in
McKeiver that there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile
court).
151. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194.
152. 332 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004).
153. Id. at 696.
154. Id. at 695.
155. Id. at 696.
156. Id.
157. United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2001).
158. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545–47 (1971).
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159

not consider the reliability issue. Jones also predated Apprendi and
did not consider the possibility of using juvenile adjudications in
160
later proceedings.
The Tighe court’s consideration of Apprendi’s
reliability requirements better fits the due process protections
161
contemplated by that court.
As applied to DW’s case, the juvenile court hearings did not
afford him the “procedural safeguards” envisioned by Apprendi and
162
McFee.
Although McFee’s challenge rested on the lack of jury
trial in juvenile court, the court did emphasize the importance of
163
trial safeguards.
Thus, DW’s juvenile adjudications do not meet
164
the reliability standard for constitutionality.
D. A Constitutional Theory: Juvenile Court Due Process Hazards and
“Reliability”
1.

Due Process Hazards: The Prevalence of Pleas in Juvenile Court

At his detention hearing on March 25, 2002, DW admitted to
the assault charge which the county later used to enhance his
159. Id.
160. See id. at 545–51.
161. On the split in jurisdictions, see Fain, supra note 131, at 512–16; Feld,
supra note 20, at 1196–1214; Molly Gulland Gaston, Note, Never Efficient, But Always
Free: How the Juvenile Adjudication Question is the Latest Sign That Almendarez-Torres
v. United States Should be Overturned, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167 (2008); Alyssa
Malzman, Note, Juvenile Strikes: Unconstitutional Under Apprendi and Blakely and
Incompatible with the Rehabilitative Ideal, 15 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 171,
182–84 (2005).
162. In McFee, the Minnesota Supreme Court discussed Apprendi in relation to
Almendaraz–Torres. State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 610–11 (2006). According to
the Minnesota Supreme Court, the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns
raised in Apprendi were mitigated in Almendarz–Torres because of procedural
safeguards and due to the fact that the defendant did not contest the accuracy of
the ‘fact’ of his prior conviction. Id.
163. The court stated:
[T]he prior conviction exception applies, not because the defendant had
a right to a jury trial in the prior proceeding, but because the prior
proceeding met all due process requirements that attached to that
proceeding. Ultimately, according to the majority, “the question of
whether juvenile adjudications should be exempt from Apprendi’s general
rule should not turn on the narrow parsing of words, but on an
examination of whether juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are
so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an exemption.”
McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 616 (quoting United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032–
33 (8th Cir. 2002)).
164. See McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 616 (quoting United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d
1183, 1190 (11th Cir. 2005)).
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felony. DW would have met with a court-appointed lawyer the
morning of the hearing. This was his only opportunity to consult
with a lawyer before his hearing. The two would have discussed his
legal rights and what might happen at the hearing. His lawyer
might have had police reports for the offense before the hearing
started, but probably not. His lawyer may have had as many as
fifteen other children to interview that morning. The purpose of
165
the hearing was to decide whether DW could be released.
DW
used this first appearance to admit the offense. His lawyer would
have had very little time with DW, could not have explored
defenses, talked to witnesses, or in any way prepare a defense for
DW. However, as with adults, the decision to admit or deny rests
166
with the client.
The prevalence of pleas in juvenile court is a primary hazard to
167
due process in juvenile justice. It has been well-established that,
as a general rule, most of those juveniles who actually possess a
statutory right to a jury trial waive this right and admit
168
delinquency.
The many constraints on the system encourage
169
Still, for those who exercise
those juveniles to waive trial rights.
this right, “it is not clear that [they] exercise their right in a
meaningful way that allows them to benefit from the enhanced
170
procedural safeguard.”
Some juveniles do not even seem to be
171
Professor Steven A.
aware of what charge they have admitted.
165. See MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 5.
166. See MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2 (2010). “It is also recognized that the
accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions
regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her
own behalf, or take an appeal.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
167. KIM BROOKS & DARLENE KAMINE, JUSTICE CUT SHORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS
IN OHIO 19, 31 (Kim Brooks & Darlene Kamine eds., 2003) [hereinafter OHIO
REPORT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Ohio_Assessment.pdf.
168. See Fain, supra note 131, at 520 n.186. Although the numbers cited by
Fain provide only a small sample of the fifty-one juvenile court jurisdictions, the
uniformity in the high frequency of plea bargaining is notable. See also Steven A.
Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?,
34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 284–87 (2007) (discussing waiver, its high prevalence in
juvenile court, and its consequences); cf. Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of
Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1447, 1488–95 (2009) (discussing
waiver and its relationship to juveniles’ perception of fairness of the process).
169. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 168, at 292.
170. Fain, supra note 131, at 519 n.181. There is evidence that most juveniles,
even where they have the right to trial by jury, plead delinquent. See id.
171. See OHIO REPORT, supra note 167, at 53. The assessment report on
juvenile defense in Ohio noted that many juveniles were not aware of what charges
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Drizin observed:
The combination of heavy caseloads, juvenile court
culture that frowns upon advocacy and lawyers who only
meet their clients on the day of adjudication creates a
system of representation ripe for wrongful convictions. In
Montana, one judge reported that he only had 2–3 trials a
year and defenders stated that cases rarely go to trial.
One attorney explained, “I tell the clients the rights that
they have, but the risks are so low, they don’t want to go
through with it. The worst that they can look at is [a
172
county facility] until 18.”
There is no transcript of the proceedings or other verbatim
record of DW’s March 25, 2002, Hennepin County Juvenile Court
hearing. Nevertheless, the State tried to use an adjudication from
this hearing against DW. The only record available was an order
from the court identifying the parties and issuing the change of
venue. The unavailable records made it impossible for the court to
review the adequacy of the procedural safeguards as promised in
McFee. Failure to afford DW a verbatim record violated his right to
due process of law.
State v. Nordstrom arose from the State’s failure to produce any
173
There was neither a
record of Nordstrom’s prior conviction.
174
The court observed that both
transcript nor a plea petition.
constitutional law and Minnesota statute required a record of
175
proceedings where incarceration might follow.
There is a
constitutional requirement that a valid guilty plea be made
176
pursuant to a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights. The court

led to their commitment because pleas resulted in charges being dropped or
modified. See id. It is significant that children would plead delinquent and not
know to what charge they were actually pleading delinquent; this fact may indicate
that children do not attach much significance to being found delinquent for any
particular offense, since their maximum time commitment is likely the same (not
beyond their eighteenth birthday).
172. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 168, at 293 (citations omitted).
173. State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 904 (Minn. 1983) (“There is no
record whatsoever in relation to Nordstrom’s guilty plea and conviction.”). In
Nordstrom, the state enhanced a DWI charge by using a prior conviction in which
Nordstrom had waived his rights and pled, without counsel and without any kind
of recording or transcript of the conviction. Id. at 903.
174. Id. at 904 (noting “a verbatim record shall be made or a petition to enter
a plea of guilty, as provided in the Appendix B to Rule 15, shall be filed with the
court” for entry of a guilty plea to a misdemeanor (internal quotations omitted)).
175. Id.
176. Id. (citing Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980), overruled by Nichols v.
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177

also observed that the criminal rules require a record as well.
A verbatim record of criminal proceedings ensures that a
178
conviction may be properly reviewed as necessary.
In State v.
179
Pederson, the defendant wanted to pay his own appellate lawyer
180
but have the public defender pay for the necessary transcript.
Basically, he qualified for public defender services, but only wanted
181
the court to order payment of the transcript fee.
No rule
182
required the public defender to pay for the transcript. The court
observed that the State had to pay for a transcript where a public183
defender-eligible appellant proceeds pro se.
The court also
found that many other states provide an indigent appellant with a
184
transcript.
Ultimately, the court found a transcript so critical to
effective representation that it ordered payment, in the name of
“the fair administration of justice,” exercising its power to
185
“supervise the criminal justice system”.
186
Similarly, in Hoagland v. State, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that a verbatim record was a critical element in the effective
187
administration of justice. In Hoagland, the defendant appealed a

United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994) (holding uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction without prison term is valid when used to enhance punishment at
subsequent conviction)).
177. Id. The court opined:
Furthermore, the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure set out in Rule
15.09 the record of guilty plea proceedings which must be made by
Minnesota courts. In the case of misdemeanors, a verbatim record “shall
be made” or “a petition to enter a plea of guilty, as provided in the
Appendix B to Rule 15, shall be filed with the court.” The Comments to
Rule 15.09, citing Casarez, Boykin and Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d
288, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 515 P.2d 273 (1973), note: “This provision for
either a verbatim record or a petition is included to satisfy the
constitutional requirement that a plea to a misdemeanor offense
punishable by incarceration must be shown on the record to be
knowingly and voluntarily entered.”
Id. (citing MINN. R. CRIM. P 15.09).
178. See id. at 905.
179. 600 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. 1999).
180. Id. at 451.
181. Id. at 452–53.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 453 (discussing State v. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1988)).
184. Id. at 453–54.
185. Id. at 454–55 (citing State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 319 (Minn. 1999)).
186. 518 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 1994).
187. Id. at 535 (“When an employee of the judicial system fails to follow clearly
stated judicial policies and consequently a defendant is deprived of a transcript to
his trial for appeal; and when it is impossible to reconstruct the trial because of the

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss2/2

38

Mahoney and McCollum: DW's Cautionary Tale

2011]

DW’S CAUTIONARY TALE

807

188

denial of post-conviction relief.
The court observed the
fundamental importance of a trial transcript for judicial review, as
codified in Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.02, which
states that “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may
be considered by the court upon motions for new trial, post-trial
motions, and on appeal although they were not brought to the
189
attention of the trial court.”
The court also referred to other jurisdictions with similar
190
rules. The United States Supreme Court has observed, “The right
to notice ‘plain errors or defects’ is illusory if no transcript is
available at least to one whose lawyer on appeal enters the case
191
after the trial is ended.”
Once a defendant establishes that no
verbatim record of a proceeding is available for review, the burden
shifts to the state to prove the conviction may be used to enhance a
192
later charge.
A transcript provides crucial due process
protections of knowing and voluntary waiver of constitutional
193
A transcript also makes possible a subsequent review of
rights.
the adequacy of those waivers both for the defendant’s efforts to
194
review the conviction and the state’s determination to use the
prior conviction for either enhancement of a subsequent charge or
195
a sentence.
2.

Due Process Hazards: The Delivery of Legal Services

Rule 24 of the Juvenile Court Rules requires the court to
appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the best interests of the
196
child in a delinquency proceeding under certain circumstances.
Rule 24.01 states: “If the parent, legal guardian or legal custodian is
trial judge’s death, that defendant is entitled to a new trial . . . .”).
188. Id. at 532.
189. Id. at 535 (citing United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303, 1305–06 (5th Cir.
1977)).
190. Id. at 535–36.
191. Id. at 535 (quoting Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 280 (1964)).
192. State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 904–05 (Minn. 1983) (“This
provision for either a verbatim record or a petition is included to satisfy the
constitutional requirement that a plea to a misdemeanor offense punishable by
incarceration must be shown on the record to be knowingly and voluntarily
entered.”).
193. See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 193–94 (1971).
194. See State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 545, 141 N.W.2d 3, 8
(Minn. 1966) (citation omitted).
195. See State v. McClenton, 781 N.W.2d 181, 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
196. MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 24.01.
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unavailable, incompetent, indifferent to, hostile to, or has interests
in conflict with the child’s best interests, a guardian ad litem shall
197
198
be appointed.”
A guardian ad litem has specific legal duties.
These duties include investigating the child’s home life,
interviewing the adults responsible for his care, and advocating for
199
his best interests.
The rules provide several protections for a
guardian, underscoring their important role in the administration
200
of justice in juvenile court. The court, in making a determination
whether a child made an intelligent and voluntary waiver of various
rights, may take into account the appointment of a guardian ad
201
litem.
At the disposition hearing on April 8, 2002, DW’s lawyer asked
the court to recognize the guardian ad litem from the CHIPS case
and appoint her to the delinquency case on behalf of DW. The
actual request read: “Mother’s parental rights were recently
terminated, and we’re asking that she be appointed guardian ad
litem for all further proceedings as well.” THE COURT: “She may.”
DW was only twelve years old at the time of this hearing. The
guardian ad litem never appeared again, and yet her appearance
was never excused or waived. Unlike criminal proceedings, where
each new offense are generally treated as distinct entities, juvenile
proceedings tend to be one continuous disposition, like an adult
on probation with new offenses. The guardian ad litem’s presence
had been ordered and should have been required.
The court’s failure to protect DW’s interests, and the choice to
move the case along, demonstrates a second hazard to due process
in juvenile courts—the delivery of legal services. The juvenile
justice system seems so invested in moving cases along that most
juveniles waive critical constitutional rights without consulting

197. Id.
198. Id. R. 24.02.
199. Id.
200. Guardians enjoy the right to attend all hearings. Id. R. 2.01. Guardians
may not be excluded from hearings. Id. R. 2.02. The guardian ad litem appointed
in the delinquency proceeding has a right to participate and advocate for the best
interests of the child at all hearings. Id. subdiv. 2. The guardian has the right to
appointment of counsel. Id. R. 3.07. The child’s lawyer cannot also be the
guardian. Id. R. 24.03. The records of the proceedings, otherwise closed to the
public, are open to guardians, as they share equal status with the lawyers. Id. R.
30.02.
201. See id. R. 3.04, subdiv. 1; id. R. 18.05, subdiv. 1(C); id. R. 19.04, subdiv.
1(C).
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counsel. In 2007 the National Juvenile Defender Center,
reported that half of all children appearing in juvenile delinquency
cases appear without a lawyer, and in some jurisdictions this figure
203
was as high as ninety percent. Without legal representation, and
considering the handicap immaturity bears, juveniles are pressed
through the system with little real regard to whether they enter
pleas which meet the constitutional requirement of being knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.
Similarly, Professor Barry Feld, of the University of
Minnesota Law School, observes that the absence of jury trials
impacts the administration of justice in a variety of ways. The
informality permits an atmosphere in which judges feel less
apprehension about allowing juveniles to proceed without a
lawyer, which endangers the accuracy and reliability of the
fact-finding process. Feld also cites studies which “strongly
question the quality of representation that appointed attorneys
provide for those delinquents who do receive the assistance of
204
counsel.”
The delivery of legal services to juveniles suffers even
when a lawyer represents the child. Juvenile defenders
incessantly complain about overwhelming caseloads. Caseload
constraints mean that lawyers can devote very little time to
counseling their young clients, who in any case may not
understand the court processes, the difficult legal concepts,
and give little thought to their own future. Under these
circumstances, where resolving cases quickly has priority,
“ensuring individualized justice becomes impossible and
accurate fact finding becomes irrelevant. . . . The impact on
children is devastating: their attorneys have only a few minutes
to spend with them, leaving them to go through the process
205
essentially alone.

202. “The National Juvenile Defender Center (NJDC) was created in 1999 to
respond to the critical need to build the capacity of the juvenile defense bar and
improve access to counsel and quality of representation for children in the justice
system.” About Us, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., http://www.njdc.info/about
_us.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2010). The NJDC provides a wide range of services
to juvenile defenders “to address practice issues, improve advocacy skills, build
partnerships, exchange information, and participate in the national debate over
juvenile crime.” Id.
203. Patricia Puritz & Katayoon Majd, Ensuring Authentic Youth Participation in
Delinquency Cases: Creating a Paradigm for Specialized Juvenile Defense Practice, 45 FAM.
CT. REV. 466, 470 (2007) (citations omitted).
204. Feld, supra note 20, at 1169–71 (citations omitted).
205. Puritz & Majd, supra note 203, at 470; see also Katherine Hunt Federle, The
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Finally, juvenile court, seen as less important than adult court,
206
Conversely, juvenile
is viewed by many as a “training ground.”
court may be thought of as the place lawyers spend the end of their
207
careers, no longer having to worry about trying jury cases. Puritz
noted that “[m]any attorneys representing children may lack the
necessary qualifications. Delinquency practice lacks prestige, and
208
many attorneys and judges would prefer to be elsewhere.”
Ironically, studies by Professor Feld suggest that juveniles who
209
appear without lawyers get “better” outcomes.
While he
acknowledges the study’s limitations, his findings and those of
others suggest—somewhat surprisingly—that juveniles with counsel
are more likely to be incarcerated and to receive other punitive
210
sanctions than those without counsel.
While the causes are
difficult to determine conclusively, Feld surmises that the presence
of juvenile defense lawyers may antagonize judges, and, conversely,
judges may be more lenient towards juveniles who are not
211
represented.
Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the
Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655, 1678 (1996) (noting that strong systemic
pressures discourage zealous advocacy at all stages of cases).
206. See Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a
Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189, 228 (2007) (describing how public
defender’s offices frequently send their least capable and newest attorneys to
juvenile cases).
207. Cf. Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 798–800
(2010) (describing structural causes contributing to inadequate representation for
juveniles, including those “defenders looking for less scrutiny from their
professional peers or superiors”).
208. Puritz & Majd, supra note 203, at 470.
209. Feld, supra note 206, at 227–28.
210. Id. (stating, based on empirical research, that when juveniles are
represented in delinquency court, they are less likely to have positive outcomes);
see also George W. Burruss, Jr. & Kemberly Kempf-Leonard, The Questionable
Advantage of Defense Counsel in Juvenile Court, 19 JUST. Q. 37, 41 (2002) (finding that
the presence of an attorney consistently increased the likelihood of juveniles
receiving out-of-home placements in all settings).
211. Feld, supra note 206, at 228–30 (suggesting that represented juveniles may
fare worse than those who are pro se because their lawyers may be inexperienced,
incompetent, biased, or overworked, and that judges may punish such juveniles
more severely because they believe the presence of counsel insulates them from
appellate reversal). It is also possible that Feld’s findings result, at least in part,
from selection bias, meaning that juveniles who are likely to either retain or accept
appointed counsel may have been charged with more serious offenses, thereby
leading to more punitive sanctions for reasons other than those suggested above.
See N. Lee Cooper et al., Fulfilling the Promise of In re Gault: Advancing the Role of
Lawyers for Children, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 651, 658–63 (1998) (discussing the
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Due Process Hazards: Failure to Provide Vigorous Defense

The Ramsey County Juvenile Court failed to protect DW’s
rights. The court made an inadequate inquiry into his waivers that
resulted in a failure to establish that DW waived his rights
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The Rules of Juvenile
Court provide that a child has the right to have a parent, a lawyer,
212
or a guardian ad litem present at any hearing. In fact, the child’s
guardian and parent have an independent right to a lawyer in
instances where a child may be placed out of his home as a
213
consequence.
Without a verbatim recording of the Hennepin
County proceedings, we have no way to evaluate the validity of
DW’s waiver of his parent, family member, or guardian. There is
just no evidence of the required waiver from the March 2002
appearances.
In the second case, the November 2003 assault, DW had both a
lawyer and a family member present (his grandfather). DW waived
his rights when he pleaded guilty. However, the waiver of trial
rights at the arraignment cannot withstand even the simplest of
214
review. The entire waiver consisted of the following:

systemic causes of ineffective representation in juvenile courts, the many reasons
that children waive counsel, and the ways in which the “cumulative effect of these
factors is a derogation of juvenile court practice itself”).
212. See, e.g., MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 2.03, subdiv. 3 (“The parent, legal guardian
or legal custodian of a child who is the subject of a delinquency or extended
jurisdiction juvenile proceeding shall accompany the child to all hearings unless
excused by the court for good cause shown.”).
213. See, e.g., id. R. 3 cmt. (2006 Main Volume) (“Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.07
implements the rights of a child’s parent(s), legal guardian or legal custodian to
participate in hearings affecting the child. After a child has been found to be
delinquent and state intervention potentially may intrude upon the parent’s
custodial interests in the child, the parent(s) have an independent right to the
assistance of counsel appointed at public expense if they are eligible for such
services.”).
214. Rule 8 formulates the inquiry the court must make before accepting as
valid a waiver of rights and admission. Id. R. 8.04, subdiv. 1. Rule 8 mandates
specific procedures and findings that shall be made before accepting a waiver. Id.
Among these are satisfaction that the child understands not only the charges and
the elements of each charge, but also a factual basis for the plea. Id. The court
must also satisfy itself that the child understands all the trial rights waived,
including the rights to remain silent, confront and cross-examine witnesses, and
the burden of proof. Id. The child must articulate that he understands the power
the court has in ordering a disposition. Id. Finally, the court must determine that
the juvenile has made a decision based upon his guilt, freely admitted, without
pressure or undue influence. Id.
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EXAMINATION
BY [defense counsel]: DW, we talked this morning about
trial and all the rights that go along with trial; is that
right?
A. Yes
Q. Do you have any questions about those?
A. No.
Q. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you
give up your right to a trial and the rights that go along
with it?
A. Yes.
Q. That’s what you want to do?
A. Yes.
DW’s adjudications demonstrate just some of the ways that the
actual practices in juvenile delinquency proceedings fail to meet
the standards contemplated by Apprendi. The unique nature of the
juvenile court gives reason to question whether juveniles vigorously
defend against adjudications as they would against criminal
215
convictions.
Children are not mature enough to consume the
full meaning of so many important elements of the full juvenile
justice process. Typically, children have very little concern for their
own future, essentially living only in the moment, especially those
children who find themselves in juvenile court in the first place.
They will have come to the attention of authorities precisely
because they have poor impulse control, inadequate coping skills,
and significant cognitive deficits. They may also be poor, without
family or shelter, and in critical need of supervision and services.
The juvenile referral may be using the child’s “crime” as a device to
find the money to provide the services or the authority to impose
them.
As noted in the introduction, the goal of juvenile court, the
element which gives it its peculiar form and denies the child his
right to a jury trial, is rehabilitation rather than punishment. With
this goal in mind, many of the professionals in the system, in which
a defense lawyer may be absent, but parents, social workers,
probation officers, and prosecutors appear, whether the state has
met the burden of proof becomes subordinate to the child’s need
for the panoply of services the system can offer after a finding of
delinquency.
215.

Fain, supra note 131, at 522.
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As for the child making the decision, he knows that the court
may only exercise jurisdiction until he turns eighteen. Whether he
pleads guilty to one charge or its lesser offense has very little
immediate real consequence to him. “When an adult chooses to
plead delinquent to manslaughter instead of murder, he is likely
making an informed choice between two distinct and determinate
sentences. In juvenile court, however, a juvenile who pleads
delinquent may face an indeterminate sentence of commitment
216
until age eighteen, regardless of the offense.”
Also, considering even a high-functioning child’s deference to
parents and other authority figures, there exist not insignificant
differences in bargaining power in plea negotiations for juveniles
and adults. The decision to plea may also be unduly influenced by
parents who may want a quick resolution to avoid continuing a
series of long days spent waiting for a few minutes of court time in
which very little happens, and even less is understood. The desire
to bring the process to a quick close may overwhelm the ability to
contemplate or realize the possible repercussions to a juvenile
217
adjudication.
As noted, parental influence may have a negative impact on
the juvenile. Parents may have interests at odds with the child,
sometimes hoping for a court order placing the child in treatment,
or, expressing a desire to have the child “tell the truth” and face his
218
consequences.
4. Due Process Hazards: The Pervasiveness of Poor Legal
Representation
In both of his cases, DW admitted to the petitions against him
at his first opportunity. His admissions moved him closer to his
release from custody. It is most unlikely that DW made his waivers
with a thought to anything more than his release. DW could have
had very little opportunity to discuss his case with anyone.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the barriers of age, class, race, and
education could have been surmounted to allow DW meaningful
interaction with the professionals trying to help him. These cases
hardly represent the due process assurances or reliability

216. Id. at 521.
217. Id. at 521–22 (citations omitted).
218. Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57
BUFF. L. REV. 1477, 1502–03 (2009).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

45

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 2

814

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:2

envisioned by the Supreme Court in Apprendi.
According to Professor Wallace J. Mlyniec, the Lupo-Ricci
Professor of Clinical Legal Studies and Director, Juvenile Justice
Clinic at the Georgetown University law school, an investigation by
219
the National Juvenile Defender Center revealed that one of the
primary impediments to quality, effective representation in the
220
juvenile court system was staggering caseloads.
His report
219. According to its website,
The National Juvenile Defender Center (NJDC) was created in 1999 to
respond to the critical need to build the capacity of the juvenile defense
bar and to improve access to counsel and quality of representation for
children in the justice system. In 2005, the National Juvenile Defender
Center separated from the American Bar Association to become an
independent organization. NJDC gives juvenile defense attorneys a more
permanent capacity to address practice issues, improve advocacy skills,
build partnerships, exchange information, and participate in the
national debate over juvenile crime. NJDC provides support to public
defenders, appointed counsel, law school clinical programs and nonprofit law centers to ensure quality representation in urban, suburban,
rural and tribal areas. NJDC offers a wide range of integrated services to
juvenile defenders, including training, technical assistance, advocacy,
networking, collaboration, capacity building and coordination.
About Us, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDERS CTR., http://www.njdc.info/about_us.php
(last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
220. OHIO REPORT, supra note 167, at 11; ELIZABETH M. CALVIN ET AL.,
WASHINGTON: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
IN JUVENILE OFFENDER MATTERS 3 (2003), available at http://www.njdc.info
/pdf/wareport.pdf; GABRIELLA CELESTE & PATRICIA PURITZ, THE CHILDREN LEFT
BEHIND: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IN LOUISIANA 62–65 (Gabriella Celeste & Patricia Puritz
eds., 2001), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/LAreport.pdf; CATHRYN
CRAWFORD ET AL., ILLINOIS: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL & QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 5 (2007), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/illinois_assessment.pdf; ELIZABETH CUMMING ET AL.,
MARYLAND: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 3 (Elizabeth Cumming et al. eds., 2003), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mdreport.pdf; LYNN GRINDALL ET AL., NORTH CAROLINA:
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 36 (Lynn Grindall et al. eds., 2003), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/ncreport.pdf; ELIZABETH GLADDEN KEHOE ET AL.,
INDIANA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 9 (2006), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf
/Indiana%20Assessment.pdf; LAVAL S. MILLER-WILSON ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 3 (2003), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf
/pareport.pdf; PATRICIA PURITZ & CATHRYN CRAWFORD, FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF
ACCESS TO COUNSEL & QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 3
(2006), available
at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Florida%20Assessment.pdf;
PATRICIA PURITZ & TAMMY SUN, GEORGIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 25–26 (Patricia Puritz et
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indicated:
Many of the states assessed had caseloads that were
staggeringly high.
Staggering caseloads make it
impossible for lawyers to perform even the most basic
tasks associated with effective lawyering. Clients were not
consulted, investigations did not take place, motions were
not filed, allegations were not contested, treatment plans
were not developed, and unnecessary transfers to adult
courts occurred.
Clients remained incarcerated for
extended periods of time, services were not provided to
clients, and clients never had viable defenses presented.
Moreover, lawyers had no time to attend training
221
programs in order to improve their skills.
Particularly discouraging are the recent observations by
Professor Barbara Fedders, of the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill School of Law, regarding the “Nature and
222
Fedders
Pervasiveness of Substandard Legal Representation.”
reports that Gault stimulated many institutions to promulgate
223
Despite the flurry of
practice guidelines for juvenile defenders.
activity, time has shown that lawyers in juvenile court do not defend
224
their clients with the vigor exercised by lawyers defending adults.
Studies conducted across the country reveal that these lawyers do
225
not interview witnesses or visit crime scenes.
They generally
under-prepare their cases through general inaction, file few

al. eds., 2001), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/georgia.pdf; PATRICIA PURITZ
ET AL., KENTUCKY: ADVANCING JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 5 (Patricia Puritz et al.
eds., 2002) available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Kentucky_Assessment.pdf;
PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., MISSISSIPPI: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN YOUTH COURT PROCEEDINGS 8 (2007), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mississippi_assessment.pdf; PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL.,
VIRGINIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 20–21 (Patricia Puritz et al. eds., 2002), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Virginia%20Assessment.pdf; CATHRYN E. STEWART ET
AL., SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE IN TEXAS 4 (2000), available
at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/TexasAssess.pdf; see also Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re
Gault at 40: The Right for Counsel in Juvenile Court A Promise Unfulfilled, 44 No. 3
CRIM. L. BULL. 371, 402 (2008).
221. Mlyniec, supra note 220, at 402.
222. Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 791
(2010).
223. See id.
224. See id. at 793.
225. Id. at 792.
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pretrial motions, do not prepare for disposition hearings, and
juvenile lawyers are untutored in the skills of trying a case to a
226
227
judge rather than a jury. They do not consult with their clients,
228
they violate their duty of loyalty and confidentiality, and they
misinform their clients, tending to believe that a disposition will
229
lead to services and interventions that the client needs anyway.
Many juvenile defendants are victims of ineffective assistance
230
This can result from factors such as poor
of counsel.
investigation, infrequent use of motions, high caseloads, overreliance on pleas, a juvenile court culture of wanting to ‘help’
juveniles, and a general lack of training among attorneys on youth
231
and adolescents.
5.

Due Process Hazards: Little Post-Conviction Review

At the time we began to defend DW, his right to review his
juvenile adjudications had passed. DW, like most juveniles, did not
even know that he could have returned to juvenile court for relief,
or sought review of his adjudications on appeal. Collateral attack
remained his only remedy. Like many juveniles, DW had little
understanding of his legal rights to relief.
Although due process requires that a juvenile adjudicated
delinquent have the same access to appeal as a criminal
defendant in the jurisdiction, and every state grants a
statutory right to appeal, far fewer juvenile cases are
appealed than are adult cases. Moreover, post-conviction
relief is a statutory right, not a constitutional right, and
232
not every state affords juveniles that right.
Especially where a juvenile’s punishment may only be
community service, or a very brief stay at an out-of-home
placement, there is little incentive to pursue post-adjudication
233
Also, juveniles, already insecure and unsure about
remedies.

226. Id. at 792–93.
227. See id. at 793 (stating that a larger number of attorneys for juveniles do
not meet with their clients outside of court proceedings).
228. See id. at 794 (stating many times attorneys will have a confidential
conversation in front of a juvenile client’s parents).
229. See id.
230. See, e.g., id. at 795 (reiterating that substandard lawyering negatively
affects a youth’s case at both the adjudicatory and dispositional phases).
231. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 168, at 289.
232. Id. at 294.
233. See Donald J. Harris, Due Process v. Helping Kids in Trouble: Implementing the
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pursuing their right to trial counsel, are less aware and even less
234
assertive in securing their right to appeal.
VI. CONCLUSION
DW’s prosecution demonstrates the need to change Minnesota
law. The difference between a conviction for a misdemeanor and a
felony is vast. It is unfair to prosecute someone for a felony based
upon juvenile adjudications from childhood. Children just do not
have the mental development necessary to make the legal decisions
235
that have this important of an impact on their future. As a society
we limit the decision-making power of children due to their
immaturity. It hardly seems reasonable to hold them to these
choices.
The juvenile court system is not designed to prompt children
to fight adjudication. As Justice Stewart observed in his dissent in
Gault:
Juvenile proceedings are not criminal trials. They are not
civil trials. They are simply not adversary proceedings.
Whether treating with a delinquent child, a neglected
child, a defective child, or a dependent child, a juvenile
proceeding’s whole purpose and mission is the very
opposite of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a
criminal court. The object of the one is correction of a
condition. The object of the other is conviction and
236
punishment for a criminal act.
Next time the opportunity arises, the Minnesota Supreme
Court should hold that juvenile adjudications not previously
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt may not be used to
enhance a criminal charge. The legislature could also amend the
statutes to allow enhancements only where there was a jury
Right to Appeal from Adjudications of Delinquency in Pennsylvania, 98 DICK. L. REV. 209,
219–20 (1994).
234. See id. at 223 (“[C]hildren don’t always understand the consequences of
court actions.”).
235. See COALITION FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF
ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE? (2006); see also Terry A.
Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 89, 95–103 (2009); Elisa Poncz, Rethinking Child Advocacy After Roper
v. Simmons: “Kids are Just Different” and “Kids are Like Adults” Advocacy Strategies, 6
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 273 (2008) (arguing that neither the “kids are
just different” nor the “kids are like adults” legal treatment is the best, but rather
that both treatments should be used together).
236. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 78–79 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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237

adjudication, which would mean EJJ cases.
In the end, the trial court never ruled on DW’s collateral
attack. The state offered DW a deal he could not refuse, and DW
settled his case.

237. See Jennifer Park, Note, Balancing Rehabilitation and Punishment: A
Legislative Solution for Unconstitutional Juvenile Waiver Policies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
786, 810–12 (2008) (outlining a proposed model of potential legislation).
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